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DIRECT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE ACTIONS 
OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 
Bruce ]. Winick* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Selective Service registrant unhappy with the classification 
1 given 
him by his local draft board has several opportunities to chal-
lenge that classification within the Selective Service System. He may 
request a personal appearance before his local board.2 If unsuc-
cessful at his personal appearance, or even if he elects not to have a 
personal appearance, the registrant may appeal to the state appeal 
board.3 If his plea is rejected by the appeal board with at least one 
member dissenting, the registrant may appeal further to the National 
Selective Service Appeal Board.4 No additional review is available 
within the Selective Service System itself. To secure further review 
of the actions of the Selective Service System, a registrant must re-
sort to the courts. 
A registrant may obtain judicial review of Selective Service action 
in any of three possible ways.I' If he submits to induction into the 
• Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1965, City University of New York; J.D. 1968, 
New York University.-Ed. 
1. "Classification is the key to selection • • • ." 32 C.F.R. § 1622.l(b) (1970). 
After registration, "each registrant shall be immediately liable for classification ••• 
and shall, as soon as practicable following his registration, be so classified • . • ." 
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). A 
registrant classified I·A, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10 (1970), or I-A-O, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.11 (1970), 
may be ordered to report for induction into military service. 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7(a) 
(1970). Unless he can establish eligibility for another classification, each registrant 
is presumed to be in class I-A and available for service. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.l(c) (1970). 
See United States v. Carroll, 398 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1968). The various classifications 
are described in 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.10-.50 (1970). If a registrant does establish grounds 
for a classification other than I-A, he must be placed in the lowest class for which 
he is determined to be eligible, with I-A-O considered the highest class. 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1623.2 (1970). See Jochim v. McAnaw, 296 F. Supp. 1305 (D.N.D. 1969). For a 
thorough discussion of the various classifications and the classification process, see 
A. TATUM &: J. TUCHlNSKY, GUIDE TO THE DRAFr 28-52, 109-226 (1968); SEL. SERV. 
L. REP. PRACTICE MANUAL 1f1[ 1016-78 (1968). 
2. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.l(a) (1970). See generally A. BLACKMAN, FACE TO FACE WITH 
YOUR DRAFT BOARD: A GUIDE TO PERSONAL .APPEARANCES (1969); A. TATUM &: J. 
TUCHINSKY, supra note 1, at 58-64; SEL. SERV. L. REP. PRACTICE MANUAL ,r,r 1079-84 
(1968). 
3. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.2 (1970). See A. TATUM&: J. TUCHINSKY, supra note 1, at 64-66; 
SEL SERV. L. REP. PRACTICE MANUAL ,J,J 1085-89 (1968). 
4. 32 C.F.R. § 1627.3 (1970). See A. TATUM &: J. TUCHINSKY, supra note 1, at 
67-69; SEL. SERV. L. REP. PRACTICE MANUAL ,J,J 1090-94 (1968). 
5. See generally Tigar, Judicial Review of Selective Service Decisions, in SELEC-
TIVE SERVICE: THE ATTORNEY'S VIEW 81 (B. Poindexter ed. 1969); Leonard &: Frantz, 
Judicial Review of Selective Service Orders, 26 THE GuII.D PRACTITIONER 85 (1967); 
[ 55] 
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Armed Forces, the registrant may challenge the validity of his in-
duction order by petitioning for habeas corpus. 6 If the registrant 
refuses to submit to induction, and is subsequently indicted for that 
refusal, he may defend the criminal prosecution on the ground that 
the order for his induction was unlawful.7 In addition to these two 
well-settled methods of obtaining postinduction judicial review, 
the registrant may have a third alternative. In certain circumstances, 
he may be able to secure direct review of the legality of his classifi-
cation prior to the date he is ordered to report for induction.8 In 
order to obtain such preinduction review, a civil suit may be brought 
in federal district court in the form of an action for a declaratory 
judgment,9 an action for an injunction,10 or an acton in the nature 
of mandamus.11 Of the three methods available for obtaining judi-
cial review of a draft classification, the preinduction action is the 
most desirable from the registrant's point of view. If successful, he 
can secure relief without incurring either the substantial risks of a 
criminal prosecution12 or the hardships of induction.13 From the 
O'Neil, Review of Selective Service Reclassifications, 37 GEo. WASH, L. REv. 536 
(1969); Comment, Judicial Review of Selective Service Action: A Need for Reform, 
56 CALIF. L. REv. 448 (1968). 
6. E.g., Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944); United States ex rel. Caputo 
V. Sharp, 286 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See generally SEL. Smv. L. REP. PRACTICE 
MANUAL ,r,J 3026-179 (1969). 
7. E.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); United States v. Rundle, 413 
F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1969). 
8. E.g., Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956); Stevenson v. 
Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 157, 303 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Itzcovitz 
v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 6, 301 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) appeal dismissed, 3 SEL. 
Smv. L. REP. 3063 (2d Cir. 1970). See generally SEL. Smv. L. REP. PRACTICE MANUAL 
,r,r 3501-679 (1969); Donahue, The Supreme Court vs. Section lO(bXJ) of the Selective 
Service Act: A Study in Ducking Constitutional Issues, 17 UCLA L. REv. 908 (1970); 
Comment, Pre-Induction Judicial Review, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 948 (1970); Comment, 
Anticipatory Attacks on Selective Service Classifications, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 899 (1969). 
9. E.g., National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Foley 
v. Hershey, 409 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1969) (per curiam). 
10. E.g., Walsh v. Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Faulkner 
v. Clifford, 289 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
11. E.g., Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.!. 1969); Carey v. Local Bd. 
No. 2, 297 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn.), affd., 412 F.2 71 (2d Cir. 1969). 
12. Refusal of induction is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, 
a fine of up to $10,000, or both. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 462(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). Moreover, the limited scope of judicial review permitted 
in a criminal prosecution (see notes 28-31 infra and accompanying text) makes the regis-
trant's chances for success slight. See Gabriel v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 369, 371 (N.D. Cal.), 
revd., 393 U.S. 256 (1968): "The lhnited and circumscribed review afforded in a 
criminal proceeding results in no review at all. It necessarily ascribes to plaintiff 
the essential elements and ingredients of criminal conduct, by the very act of his 
seeking an orderly review of the draft board classification." See also Comment, 
Judicial Review of Selective Service Action: A Need for Reform, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 
448, 461-62 (1968). 
13. See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1946) Gustice Murphy, 
concurring): 
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Selective Service System's point of view, however, this method is 
potentially the most dangerous to the rapid and efficient adminis-
tration of the selection process.14 This Article will consider the avail-
ability of preinduction judicial review and the procedural problems 
incident to such review. 
II. AVAILABILITY OF PREINDUCTION JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. Judicial Review Prior to the 1967 Act 
Before the enactment of the Military Selective Service Act of 
1967,111 the draft law contained no explicit provision relating to 
judicial review of the actions of the Selective Service System. The 
Acts of 1917,16 1940,17 and 194818 provided simply that decisions of 
local and appeal boards were to be "final."19 These provisions were 
[The remedy of habeas corpus] may be quite illusory in many instances. 
It requires one first to enter the armed forces and drop every vestige of civil rights. 
Military orders become the law of life and violations are met with summary 
court-martial procedure. No more drastic condition precedent to judicial review 
has ever been framed. Many persons with religious or conscientious scruples are 
unable to meet such a condition. But even if a person is inducted and a quest 
is made for a writ of habeas corpus, the outlook is often bleak. The proceeding 
must be brought in the jurisdiction in which the person is then detained by 
the military, which may be thousands of miles removed from his home, his 
friends, his counsel, his local board and the witnesses who can testify in his 
behalf. Should he overcome all these obstacles and possess enough money to 
proceed further, he still faces the possibility of being shifted by the military 
at a moment's notice into another jurisdiction, thus making the proceeding 
moot. There is little assurance, moreover, that the military will treat his efforts 
to obtain the v.Tit with sympathetic understanding. These practical difficulties 
may thus destroy whatever efficacy the remedy might otherwise have and cast 
considerable doubt on the assumption that habeas corpus proceedings necessarily 
guarantee due process of law to inductees. 
See also Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1362, 1382 (1953); Comment, supra note 5, 
at 460-61. 
14. The courts have repeatedly stressed the power of Congress to raise armies 
speedily. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968); Falbo v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1944). Congress' concern that preinduction judicial review 
"could seriously affect the administration of the Selective Service System," H. R. REP. 
No, 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1967), was the principal reason for the 1967 
amendment to § 10(b)(3) which explicitly barred such review. Military Selective Service 
Act of 1967 § l(S)(c) [amending Universal Military Training and Service Act § I0(b)(3)], 
codified in 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See notes 47-56 infra 
and accompanying text. 
15. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-67 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
16. Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 80. 
17. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 10(a)(2), 54 Stat. 893. 
Prior to the 1940 Act, a registrant was deemed to be under the jurisdiction of the 
military and subject to court-martial proceedings from the date of the induction 
order, even if he never submitted to induction. Franke v. Murray, 248 F. 865 (8th 
Cir. 1918). The 1940 Act changed this by providing that a registrant is not subject to 
military jurisdiction until actually inducted. Ch. 720, § 11, 54 Stat. 895 (1940). 
18. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625 § 10(b)(3), 62 Stat. 620, as amended, 
50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1964). 
19. See notes 16-18 supra. Moreover, § 13(b) of the 1948 Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 463(b) 
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first considered by the Supreme Court in the World War II case of 
Falbo v. United States,20 a criminal prosecution for refusal to report 
for civilian work.21 The Court held that a registrant who had failed 
to exhaust his administrative remedies22 would not be permitted to 
raise in such a prosecution the defense that he had been erroneously 
classified.23 Since the statute failed to authorize intermediate judi-
cial challenges of orders to report, the Court concluded that Congress 
must have intended to prohibit such "litigious interruption" of the 
selective service process.24 
In Estep v. United States,25 decided after World War II had 
ended, the petitioners, unlike Falbo, had reported and were accepted 
for induction before refusing to submit. The Court held that the 
petitioners could secure judicial review of their draft classifications 
(1964), explicitly excludes the Selective Service System from the judicial review to which 
action by any administrative agency is normally subject under § 10 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968). See Moskowitz v. Kindt, 273 F. Supp. 646, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affd., 394 F.2d 
648 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1014 (1969); Feldman v. Local Bd. No. 22 of the 
Selective Serv. Sys., 239 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
20. 320 U.S. 549 (1944). 
21. Falbo, a Jehovah's Witness, had been classified as a conscientious objector 
and ordered to report to a civilian public-service camp pursuant to Selective Training 
and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889. He was prosecuted for refusing 
to appear at the camp. The analogous case for a registrant who did not claim to be 
a conscientious objector would be a refusal to report to the induction center. 
22. Since had he reported he might have been rejected at the civilian camp, 
thereby mooting the controversy, Falbo was held to have omitted a "necessary inter-
mediate step in a united and continuous process designed to raise an army speedily 
and efficiently." 320 U.S. at 553. This is actually a problem of ripeness. See Feld• 
man v. Local Bd. No. 22 of the Selective Serv. Sys., 239 F. Supp. 102, 105-06 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964). See also Tigar, supra note 5, at 85-86. 
The continued validity of the Falbo requirement of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies has been placed in doubt by the recent decision in McKart v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), in which the Supreme Court held that the doctrine is 
inapplicable when the question raised is one of statutory construction, and when 
an application of the doctrine would deprive a criminal defendant of an otherwise 
valid defense. 395 U.S. at 197-99. See United States v. Powers, 413 F.2d 834, 836 n.l 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 923 (1969); United States v. Prescott, 301 F. Supp. 
1116, 1118 (D.N.H. 1969). Presumably, the doctrine would have no greater effect in 
preinduction actions. In Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970), 
a case in which the Court permitted preinduction review, the plaintiff had filed 
his action in district court prior to the conclusion of his appeal to the state appeal 
board-a classic case of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Comment, 
Administrative Law-Selective Service-Pre-Induction Judicial Review Held Unavail• 
able to Registrant Claiming Statutory Deferment, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 804, 822 (1969). 
23. Falbo had defended on the basis that he was a minister, and, as such, should 
have been exempted from all service pursuant to Selective Training and Service Act 
of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(d), 54 Stat. 887. 320 U.S. at 550. The ministerial exemption is 
currently covered in 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (1964). 
24. 320 U.S. at 554. 
25. 327 U.S. 114 (1946). 
November 1970] Review of Selective Service Actions 59 
since they had exhausted their administrative remedies.26 The Court 
refused to construe the failure of the statute to provide explicitly 
for judicial review as a denial of the power of the federal courts to 
grant relief in the exercise of the general jurisdiction conferred 
upon them by Congress, especially since such review may be re-
quired by the Constitution.27 The Court interpreted the finality 
provision of the statute as limiting the scope of judicial review, but 
not the right to it. In line with this interpretation, the Court held 
that the provision restricted judicial scrutiny of local board classifi-
cations to cases in which there is no basis in fact for the board's 
classification,28 or in which the board's action is in conflict with 
the statute29 or the regulations.30 In such cases31 the board's action 
is in excess of its jurisdiction, and therefore subject to judicial 
review. 
In addition to the limited judicial review available in a criminal 
prosecution, the courts have long held that a registrant can submit 
to induction and challenge the legality of the induction order by 
habeas corpus.32 The scope of review in habeas corpus proceedings 
26. 327 U.S. at 123. 
27. 327 U.S. at 120. The Court rejected as futile a construction of the Act that 
would have denied a registrant the opportunity to defend in a criminal prosecution 
on the ground that his local board acted beyond its jurisdiction. Since a registrant 
who had exhausted his administrative remedies could contest the validity of his in-
duction order by habeas corpus, even after conviction, to construe the statute as 
making habeas corpus the exclusive remedy would require the courts "to march up 
the hill when it is apparent from the beginning that they will have to march down 
again." 327 U.S. at 123-25. 
28. 327 U.S. at 122-23. The basis-in-fact standard has been further developed in 
subsequent cases. E.g., Witmer v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953). See Comment, 
The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54 CALIF, L. REv. 
2123, 2137-41 (1966). The standard has been codified by the 1967 Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1964). 
29. E.g., a registrant ordered to report for induction by a board of another state 
could raise the defense that the board acted beyond its jurisdiction in violation of 
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § I0(a)(2), 54 Stat. 893. 327 U.S. 
at 120. Section 10(a)(2) is currently covered by 50 U.S.C. App. § 460 (1964). 
30. E.g., the refusal of a local board to reopen a registrant's classification upon 
written request of the state director would be in violation of the regulations and 
could be raised by a registrant as a defense to a criminal prosecution. 327 U.S. at 121. 
Section I0(b)(l) of the 1948 Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(l) (1964), authorizes the 
President "to provide the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions" 
of the Act. The President has exercised this authority by issuing Selective Service 
System Regulations, codified in 32 C.F.R. §§ 1600-90.23 (1970), and by delegating to the 
Director of Selective Service the authority to issue regulations concerning the admin-
istration of the Selective Service System. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.l(a) (1970). See 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 460(c) (1964). 
31. The scope of judicial review has since been expanded to include the defense 
that the statute itself was unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 
846 (2d Cir. 1964), a/fd., 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
32. E.g., Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944); Application of Kanas, 385 F.2d 
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is also limited to cases in which the board has acted beyond the 
scope of its jurisdiction, such as when the board has made an error 
of law or when there is no basis in fact for its classification.33 
Prior to 1967, the courts construed the finality provision of the 
draft law as barring judicial review of Selective Service action ex-
cept in a criminal prosecution for refusal of induction or on a 
petition for habeas corpus after submission to induction.34 Direct 
judicial review, or review prior to either the acceptance or refusal 
of induction, was, with only a few exceptions, held to be unavail-
able.35 
In two of the cases in which preinduction review was permitted 
prior to 1967, Tomlinson v. Hershey86 and Townsend v. Zimmer-
man, 37 the courts did not consider the finality provision. In Tomlinson, 
the district court refused to dismiss a complaint for injunctive and 
declaratory relief and held, without discussing the question of re-
viewability, that an order to report for induction was invalid when 
the local board had failed to act on the plaintiff's request for a 
deferment. Similarly, in Townsend, Judge (now Justice) Potter 
Stewart's opinion, while setting aside an induction order issued 
during the pendency of plaintiff's appeal-in violation of the regu-
lations-did not discuss the cases limiting review to either habeas 
corpus or to a criminal prosecution. In a third case, Ex parte 
Fabiani,88 the plaintiff claimed in a petition for habeas corpus that 
the issuance of an induction order placed him in constructive cus-
tody. The court granted preinduction review and held that the: 
board's reclassification of the plaintiff on the ground that the medical 
school he attended was in a foreign country was contrary to the 
regulations and without basis in fact. The court in Fabiani rejected 
the Government's contention that the plaintiff was restricted to the 
506 (2d Cir. 1967); Commanding Officer v. United States ex rel. Bumanis, 207 F.2d 499 
(6th Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943); 
United States ex rel. Vellrath v. Volatile, 308 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
33. Eagle v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1946); United 
States ex rel. Colby v. Commanding Officer, 281 F. Supp. 989, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
34. E.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 377 (1955); Tamarkin v. Selective 
Serv. Sys. Local Draft Bd. No. 47, 243 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 825 
(1957); Watkins v. Rupert, 224 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1955) (per curiam); Muhammad Ali 
v. Connally, 266 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. Tex. 1967). 
35. See cases collected in Comment, Anticipatory Attacks on Selective Service Clas-
sifications, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 900 n.10 (1969). 
36. 95 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1949). 
37. 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956). 
38. 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952). 
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"desperate altematives"39 of either submitting to induction and 
bringing habeas corpus or refusing induction and defending in a 
criminal prosecution, since to uphold such a contention would be 
"exactly that type of judicial circuity and waste motion which the 
Supreme Court in the Estep decision has counseled us to avoid."40 
Until 1967, Tomlinson, Townsend, and Fabiani were the only 
cases allowing judicial review prior to induction.41 In that year, the 
Second Circuit decided Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board Num-
ber 16, 42 which granted preinduction relief to registrants who had 
been declared delinquent and reclassified I-A for participating in a 
demonstration at a local draft board in protest against the Vietnam 
War. Although the court conceded that in the ordinary case relief 
prior to induction would be unavailable for a mere adverse classifica-
tion, it would not agree that this was true when first amendment rights 
were involved. The court held that punitive reclassification intended 
to punish activity arguably protected by the first amendment had a 
chilling effect on such activity within the meaning of Dombrowski 
v. Pfister, 43 and therefore required immediate judicial relief not-
withstanding the failure of the plaintiffs to have exhausted their 
administrative remedies.44 Reasoning that the local boards lacked 
authority to use the delinquency power to deal with conduct which 
under the statute was to be punished exclusively in the federal 
courts, the court further held that the local boards had exceeded 
their jurisdiction by reclassifying the plaintiffs.45 In dictum, the 
court indicated that even if first amendment considerations were 
not present, it would be permissible for the courts to provide relief 
at any time when a local board acts in flagrant disregard of the 
regulations and thus clearly in excess of its jurisdiction:16 
39. 105 F. Supp. at 143. 
40. 105 F. Supp. at 143-44. 
41. In Schwartz v. Strauss, 206 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1953), the court affirmed the 
opinion of the district court which had held that under no circumstances was pre-
induction review permissible. However, Judge Frank, concurring, expressed the opinion 
that such review would be available in a case in which, on undisputed facts, the 
board's lack of jurisdiction was manifest. 206 F.2d at 767. 
42. 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir, 1967). 
43. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional 
Law, 69 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 808 (1969). 
44. 372 F.2d at 823-25. 
45. 372 F.2d at 820-22. 
46. 372 F.2d at 826. The court cited with approval the case of Townsend v. 
Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) (see text accompanying note 87 supra), 
and Judge Frank's concurring opinion in Schwartz v. Strauss, 206 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 
1953) (see note 41 supra). 
62 Michigan Law Review 
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Congressional reaction to the Wolff case was immediate. In en-
acting the Military Selective Service Act of 1967,47 Congress amended 
section 10(b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service 
Act48 by inserting a provision explicitly designed to bar preinduc-
tion judicial review. The amendment provides: 
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing 
of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, 
except as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under 
section 12 of this title, after the registrant has responded either 
affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction, 
or for civilian work in the case of a registrant determined to be 
opposed to participation in war in any form: Provided, that such 
review shall go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved 
to local boards, appeal boards, and the President only where there 
is no basis in fact for the classification assigned to such registrant.49 
The Senate version of the 1967 amendment, although including in 
the legislative history a reaffirmation of the original congressional 
intent that judicial review prior to induction be unavailable,150 left 
section 10(b)(3) unchanged. The House Armed Services Committee, 
however, at the urging of the Director of the Selective Service 
System, 51 deemed it desirable to rewrite the provision in order more 
clearly to re-enunciate the eixsting rule of judicial review.52 The Ian-
47. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-67 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), amending 50 U.S.C. App. 
§§ 451-73 (1964). 
48. Ch. 625, § 10(b)(3), 62 Stat. 618 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460 (b)(3) 
(1964). Section 1(1) of the 1967 amendments changed the title of the Act from 
"Universal Military Training and Service Act" to "Military Selective Service Act 
of 1967." 50 U.S.C. App. § 451(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), amending 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 451(a) (1964). 
49. Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 1(8)(c) [amending Universal Military 
Training and Service Act § 10(b)(3)], codified in 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968). 
50. S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 10 (1967): 
Until recently, there was no problem in the observance of the finality provision. 
In several recent cases, however, district courts have been brought into selective 
service processing prematurely. The committee attaches much importance to 
the finality provisions and reemphasizes the original intent that judicial review 
of classifications should not occur until after the registrant's administrative rem-
edies have been exhausted and the registrant presents himself for induction. 
51. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Scss. 
2636-38 (1967). 
52. See H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1967): 
The committee was disturbed by the apparent inclination of some courts 
to review the classification action of local or appeal boards before the registrant 
had exhausted his administration remedies. Existing law quite clearly precludes 
such a judicial review until after the registrant has been ordered to report for 
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guage inserted by the House committee was adopted by the House 
and accepted by the Senate in conference.53 Although the Wolff 
decision was not mentioned by name, the reference in the Senate 
report to "several recent cases"54 leaves no doubt that the congres-
sional reaction was aimed at that Second Circuit case decided less 
than four months before. 55 Congress deemed necessary the elimina-
tion of preinduction judicial review such as that permitted in 
Wolff, in the words of the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, "to prevent litigious interruptions of procedures to 
provide necessary military manpower."56 
It is thus clear that the congressional purpose in amending sec-
tion IO(b)(3) was to overrule by statute any decisions like Wolff 
which tended to expand the concept of preinduction judicial review. 
The imprecision of the language utilized in the amendment, how-
ever, raises the question whether Congress intended to accomplish 
more than that limited purpose. There is, for example, ·no reference 
in the new formulation to the remedy of habeas corpus. By excepting 
only review as a defense to a criminal prosecution from the bar on 
judicial review,57 could Congress have intended to eliminate review 
by means of habeas corpus? Although the language of the amend-
ment appears to do this, the legislative history indicates that Con-
gress had no such intention.58 In view of this legislative history, and 
induction and has responded either affirmatively or negatively to such an order. 
In view of this inclination of the courts to prematurely inquire into the clas-
sification action of local boards, the committee has rewritten this provision of 
the law so as to more clearly enunciate this principle. The committee was 
prompted to take this action smce continued disregard of this principle of the 
law by various courts could seriously affect the administration of the Selective 
Service System. 
53. H.R. REP. No. 346, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1967). 
54. S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967). 
55. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 245. n.7 
(1968) Oustice Harlan, concurring). 
56. 113 CoNG. REc. 15,426 (1967) (remarks of Senator Russell). 
57. Although § IO(b)(3) bars review "until after the registrant has responded 
either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report," the affirmative•response 
language cannot be deemed to refer to habeas corpus, since that language is modified 
by the phrase, "except as a defense to a criminal prosecution •••• " 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965·1968). 
58. The Senate committee report stated: 
A registrant who presents himself for induction may challenge his classification 
by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after his induction. If the registrant does not 
submit to induction, he may raise as a defense to a criminal prosecution the 
issue of the legality of the classification. 
S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. IO (1967). 
In describing the effect of the amendment, the House Armed Services Committee 
stated that it: 
[r)eenunciates the principle already in existing law that the courts cannot review 
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in view of the serious doubt about the constitutional validity of the 
statute if it is read to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,69 the Gov-
ernment has conceded that section IO(b)(3) does not abolish that 
remedy, 60 and the courts have so held. 61 
A second problem stemming from the amendment's language 
concerns the proviso that judicial review shall go to the question 
of the jurisdiction of the local board "only when there is no basis 
in fact for the classification assigned."62 By failing to include the 
case in which the board has made an error of law, this proviso ap-
pears on its face to change the rules on the scope of review developed 
in Estep and subsequent cases.63 It is unclear whether Congress in-
tended such a major change, since the only reference to this question 
in the legislative history merely paraphrases the statutory provi-
sion. 64 Thus, aside from the language of the amendment itself, there 
is no reason to believe that Congress intended anything other than 
a codification of the Estep rule.66 For this reason, the courts have 
held that the amendment does not alter the scope of review.66 
A further question raised by the language of the amendment 
is whether the phrase barring review until "after the registrant has 
responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report"67 
was meant to alter the requirement that a registrant exhaust his 
the classification action of the Selective Service System until after a registrant 
has been ordered to report for induction and has responded either affirmatively 
or negatively to such an order • • . • 
H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967) (emphasis added). See Oestereich v. 
Selective Serv. Sys. Local :Bd. No. 11,393 U.S. 233,248 (1968) (Justice Stewart, dissenting). 
59. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, and the discussion in Hart, The Power of Congress 
To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1362, 1396-401 (1953). 
60. :Brief for Respondents at 22-23, 60, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local :Bd. 
No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968). 
61. E.g., Morgan v. Underwood, 406 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, !196 U.S. 
944 (1969); United States ex rel. Wilkerson v. Commanding Officer, 286 F. Supp. 290 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States ex rel. Caputo v. Sharp, 286 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
62. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
63. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text. 
64. The conference report states that "[t]his language • • • provides that any 
such judicial review shall extend only to whether there is any basis in fact for the 
classification assigued." H.R. REP. No. 346, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1967). 
65. See O'Neil, supra note 5, at 543. 
66. E.g., United States v. Lybrand, 279 F. Supp. 74, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 1967): "The 
language of the statute and its legislative history point to the conclusion that 
Congress left untouched the power of the courts to consider-in a criminal prosecution 
-jurisdictional errors other than those dealing with classification." See also Kurjan v. 
Commanding Officer, 3 SEL. SERv. L. R.EP. 3118 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. :Bey, !I 
SEL. SERV. L. R.EP. 3097 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
67. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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administrative remedies. The rule under Falbo v. United States68 
requires a registrant who seeks to challenge his classification in court 
to report to the induction station and refuse to take the symbolic 
step forward. Since a registrant who refuses to appear at the induc-
tion station can be said to have responded negatively to an order to 
report, it has been suggested that the amendment modifies the Falbo 
rule.69 Despite this ambiguity in statutory language, the legislative 
history indicates that Congress was concerned merely with the 
timing of judicial review, and not with the exhaustion question.70 
The Falbo rule was thus left unchanged by the 1967 amendment. 
However, that rule has been judicially modified more recently.71 
A fourth question concerns the language of the amendment 
which bars review only of the "classification or processing of any 
registrant."72 It has been suggested, by analogy to cases involving 
judicial review of National Labor Relations Board certification 
orders,73 that this language precludes judicial review of the autho-
rized activities of draft boards, but not of acts wholly outside a 
board's jurisdiction.74 Although the limiting words "classification 
or processing" could in this way provide a textual basis for a narrow 
reading of the amendment, 75 such an interpretation would frustrate 
the Congressional design behind the amendment to section IO(b)(3). 
Although poorly drafted, the amendment was clearly intended to 
bar all judicial review prior to induction.76 
68. 320 U.S. 549 (1944). See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text. 
69. United States v. Lemmens, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3185 (7th Cir. 1970). See Tigar, 
supra note 5; Griffiths, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 827, 829-30 n.15 (1968). 
70. The House conference report states that the amendment is "intended to 
make clear that there shall be no judicial review of classification except as a defense 
to a criminal prosecution after a person has exhausted his administrative remedies 
and presented himself for induction." H.R. REP. No. 346, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 
(1967). See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 206-07 n.2 (1969) Gustice White, 
concurring). 
71. See cases cited in note 22 supra. 
72. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
73. E.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 185 (1958). See O'Neil, supra note 5, at 544-45. 
74. Griffiths, Some Notes on the Solicitor General's Memorandum in Oestereich: 
Concerning Punitive Classifications and § lO(bXJ) of the Act, I SEL. SERv. L. REP. 
4012, 4013 (1968). 
75. The courts in Bucher v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 2, 421 F.2d 24 
(3d Cir. 1970), and National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 
1969), based their decisions allowing preinduction review on a literal interpretation 
of the "classification or processing" language. See also Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. 
Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 240 (1968) Gustice Harlan, concurring). Contra, Zig• 
mond v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 284 F. Supp. 732, 734 (D. Mass.), stay of 
induction denied, 396 F.2d 290 (1st Cir.), application for stay denied, 391 U.S. 930 
(1968). See notes 212-23 infra and accompanying text. 
76. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text. Section I0(b)(3) does not, however, 
bar actions seeking the production of information which concerns the operations 
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Prior to Supreme Court Consideration 
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Judicial construction of the amended section IO(b)(3) was not 
long in coming. Several cases attempting to enjoin inductions were 
filed in the wake of the successful attack by the plaintiffs in Wolff.17 
Furthermore, a directive issued to all local boards by Lieutenant 
General Lewis B. Hershey, the National Director of Selective Service, 
recommended the reclassification of registrants who engaged in anti-
war protest and other acts in violation of the Selective Service Act and 
regulations.78 The directive resulted in many punitive reclassifi-
cations throughout the country,79 which in tum led to suits chal-
lenging such reclassifications.80 The first courts to consider the 
validity of these reclassifications held section IO(b)(3) effective to 
bar such preinduction actions.81 Although one court held the re-
strictions on judicial review contained in the section to be an un-
constitutional violation of due process, 82 and a few granted relief in 
of the Selective Service System. By retaining § 13(b) of the statute, 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 463(b) (1964), which excludes the Selective Service System from the operation of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 551-59, 701-06 (Supp. III, 1965-67), except for the public-information section of 
that Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III, 1965-1967), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. II, 1965-
1966), Congress indicated that freedom-of-information actions were not to be barred 
by the new judicial review provision. See e.g., Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418 
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969); Schmidt v. Hall, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3320 (W.D. Wis. 1969); 
Martin v. Neuschel, 1 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3002 (E.D. Pa.), vacated and 1'emanded, 396 
F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1968). 
77. E.g., Costas Elena v. President of the United States, 288 F. Supp. 388 (D.P.R. 
1968); Johnson v. Clark, 281 F. Supp. 112 (D. Ariz. 1968). 
78. Letter from Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey to All Members of the Selective Service 
System, Oct. 26, 1967, in N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1967, § 1, at 2, cols. 3-5, reprinted in 
Turley v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 134, 301 F. Supp. 845, 848-49 (C.D. Cal. 
1969); Selective Serv. Local Bd. Memorandum No. 85 (Oct. 24, 1967). Both the 
Hershey letter and Memorandum No. 85 provide for delinquency reclassifications: 
the memorandum was aparently attached to the letter when it was sent to the local 
boards. See National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 
1969). The events following the issuance of the now famous "Hershey letter" are 
discussed in H. MARMION, SELECTIVE SERVICE: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE 162-63 (1968). 
79. See L. HERsHEY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE 47-48 (4th ed. 1969). 
80. E.g., Zigmond v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 284 F. Supp. 732 (D. Mass.), 
stay of induction denied, 396 F.2d 290 (1st Cir.), application for stay denied, 391 U.S. 
930 (1968); Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 284 F. Supp. 749 (D. Conn. 
1968), afjd., 406 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969), Tevd., 396 U.S. 460 (1970); National Student 
Assn. v. Hershey, 1 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3026 (D.D.C. 1968), revd., 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969) (class action to declare Hershey directive void). 
81. E.g., Carpenter v. Hendrix, 277 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Moskovitz v. 
Kindt, 273 F. S_upp. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1967), afjd., 394 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 1014 (1969). 
82. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968), Tevd., 411 F.2d 1217 
(9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam). Accord, Gabriel v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Cal.), 
Tevd., 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (per curiam). 
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preinduction actions, 83 most courts sustained the section against 
constitutional attack84 and denied relief.85 
In one of the early reclassification cases a registrant named 
Oestereich, who had held a IV-D exemption as a divinity student,86 
was reclassified I-A delinquent87 after he returned his draft card to 
the Government in protest against American participation in the 
Vietnam War. After exhausting his administrative appeals and being 
ordered to report for induction, Oestereich brought suit seeking 
review of his local board's action and an injunction restraining his 
induction. The district court dismissed the action, relying on section 
10(b)(3),88 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision per curiam.89 
Oestereich petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, 
and the Solicitor General, in an unusual memorandum, urged the 
Court to reverse the decisions of the two lower federal courts.90 Since 
Oestereich's divinity student exemption was provided by the statute, 
a decision to deny him preinduction review would have been in 
direct conflict with the congressional grant of exemption. In order to 
avoid such conflict, the Solicitor General urged a construction of 
section IO(b)(3) that would permit review.91 The Solicitor General 
argued that section 10(b)(3) should be construed "as applicable to 
the generality of situations where the local board has applied its 
judgment, but to exclude purported action of a board which is in 
fact contrary to an exemption which has been expressly granted by 
83. Faulkner v. Clifford, 289 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Rheingans v. Clark, 
1 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3380 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Turley v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 
134, 301 F. Supp. 845 (C.D. Cal. 1969). 
84. E.g., Hodges v. Clark, 291 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Foran v. Weinhoff, 
291 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Wis. 1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 529 (1969) (per curiam). 
85. E.g., Hennessy v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 21, 292 F. Supp. 465 (D. Mont. 
1968); Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afjd., 393 U.S. 316 (1969) (per 
curiam). 
86. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (1964); 32 C.F.R. § 1622.43 (1970). 
87. Oestereich's board declared him a delinquent, pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) 
(1970), for failure to have a registration certificate in his possession as required by 32 
C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1970). The board's action may have been in response to the Hershey 
directive discussed in note 78 supra and accompanying text. 
88. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 280 F. Supp. 78 (D. Wyo. 
1968). 
89. 390 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1968). 
90. Memorandum for Respondents at 13, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. 
No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968). 
91. Several courts enjoined inductions in cases raising issues similar to those pre-
sented in Oestereich, and those courts based their decisions on the Solicitor General's 
concession. E.g., United States v. Imus, 398 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1968); Kimball v. Selec-
tive Serv. Local Bd. No. 15, 283 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Linzer v. Selective Serv. 
Local Bd. No. 64, 293 F. Supp. 772 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) 
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statute.''92 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Oestereich,93 
and also agreed to hear the Government's appeal in Gabriel v. 
Clark,94 a decision in which the Federal District Court for the 
Nothem District of California had held section I0(b)(3) unconstitu-
tional and had enjoined the induction of a registrant who claimed 
he was entitled to classification as a conscientious objector. 
D. The Oestereich and Gabriel Decisions in 
the Supreme Court 
On December 16, 1968, the Supreme Court decided Oestereich9 r, 
and Gabriel,96 in each case reversing the decision of the lower court. 
In Oestereich, the Court refused to read section I0(b)(3) to pre-
clude preinduction judicial review of the board's "basically lawless" 
removal of petitioner's "plain and unequivocal" statutory exemption 
for "activities unrelated to the merits of granting or continuing 
that exemption.''97 Noting that section IO(b)(3) purports on its 
face to remove the remedy of habeas corpus, the Court stated that 
"no one .•. suggests that § IO(b)(3) can sustain a literal reading.''98 
Such a literal interpretation, the Court reasoned, would do violence 
to the clear mandate of section 6(g) of the Act,99 which requires 
the exemption of ministerial students. Finding section I0(b)(3) 
to be "another illustration" of "where literalness in statutory lan-
guage is out of harmony . . . with an Act taken as an organic 
whole,"100 the Court refused to construe it to bar preinduction 
review in cases involving "a clear departure by the Board from 
its statutory mandate"101 when there is "no exercise of discretion 
by a Board in evaluating evidence and in determining whether a 
claimed exemption is deserved."102 Acknowledging that the literal 
language of section IO(b)(3) would, despite the concededly unlawful 
action of Oestereich's board,103 prevent the petitioner from ob-
92. Memorandum for Respondents at 12, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. 
No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968). 
93. 391 U.S. 912 (1968). 
94. 287 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Cal. 1968). 
95. 393 U.S. 233 (1968). 
96. 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (per curiam). 
97. 393 U.S. at 237~38. 
98. 393 U.S. at 238. 
99. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (1964). 
100. 393 U.S. at 238. 
101. 393 U.S. at 238. 
102. 393 U.S. at 238. 
103. The Solicitor General conceded that Oestereich's local board lacked the au-
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taining judicial redress prior to induction, the Court refused "to 
construe the Act with unnecessary harshness,"104 and held that 
preinduction judicial review is not precluded "in cases of this 
type."105 
Justice Harlan concurred in the Court's decision in Oestereich 
on the basis that the "classification or processing" language of sec-
tion IO(b)(3), although applicable to the "numerous discretionary, 
factual, and mixed law-fact determinations which a Selective Service 
board must make,"106 does not apply to purely legal claims. Justice 
Harlan found that an interpretation of the provision which barred 
preinduction judicial review of such claims was not indicated either 
by the legislative history107 or by the statute's purpose.108 Further-
more, he felt that such an interpretation would raise serious con-
stitutional problems since the effect of such a construction would 
be to "deprive petitioner of his liberty without the prior opportu-
nity to present to any competent forum-agency or court-his 
thority to reclassify him and order him to report for induction. Brief for the Respon-
dents at 66, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968), 
and the Court so held. 393 U.S. at 237. The Director of Selective Service, however, 
contrary to the position adopted by the Solicitor General, had contended that the 
board possessed this authority. Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Dir, 
of Selective Serv., at 7-9, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 
233 (1968); Brief for the Respondents at 71-72, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Lo-
cal Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. at 233 (1968). 
104. 313 U.S. at 238. The Court found that it would be overly harsh to restrict a 
registrant either to a criminal prosecution or to a habeas corpus proceeding after in-
duction in order to secure relief from the basically lawless action of his board. The 
Government had conceded that such a restriction would be "a very heavy burden to 
put on the citizen." Memorandum for the Respondents at 13, Oestereich v. Selective 
Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968). 
105. 398 U.S. at 239. For an analysis of the Court's decision as an example of 
forced statutory construction in the avoidance of a constitutional question, see Donahue, 
supra note 8, at 919-22. 
106. 398 U.S. at 240. 
107. Although noting that the amendment to § 10(b)(3) was precipitated by Wolff, 
Justice Harlan distinguished that case on the ground that it involved claims of local 
board maladministration or misapplication of the statutes or regulations, rather than 
challenges to the validity of the laws themselves. 393 U.S. at 245 n.7. But the court in 
Wolff had upheld claims that the local boards involved acted wholly without jurisdic-
tion and in violation of constitutional rights. Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 
372 F.2d 817, 820-22 (2d Cir. 1967). If there is any distinction between such malad-
ministration and facial invalidity of the laws themselves, the Wolff court did not find 
one; rather, it held that "the justiciability of a given case cannot rest upon a distinc-
tion between a statute void on its face and a statute which is being applied in an un-
constitutional fashion •••• " 372 F.2d at 824. 
108. Justice Harlan reasoned that a claim of facial invalidity can be disposed of on 
the pleadings without significantly interrupting the orderly processing of registrants. 
Moreover, he noted, Selective Service boards, as administrative agencies, are wholly 
unsuitable forums for the adjudication of such constitutional claims, 393 U.S. at 241-4,, 
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substantial claim that he was ordered inducted pursuant to an 
unlawful procedure."109 
Three Justices dissented, relying on the clear congressional in-
tent to bar review in cases such as Oestereich.110 The dissenters 
could find no clash between the procedural provision concerning 
the timing of judicial review and the substantive provision creating 
the exemption for divinity students.m Since the Court did not 
question the constitutionality of section IO(b)(3), the dissenting 
opinion could find no justification for disregarding the clear terms 
of the section simply because they were deemed harsh.112 
In Gabriel, decided on the papers without oral argument or 
briefing, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the district court 
decision that section IO(b)(3) was unconstitutional and upheld 
the provision's preclusion of direct judicial review.113 While the 
IV-D divinity student classification involved in Oestereich was un-
conditionally mandated by the statute, the I-O conscientious-objector 
classification sought by the registrant in Gabriel was merely autho-
rized by the Act, its issuance being expressly conditioned on the 
registrant's claim being "sustained by the local board."114 The 
Court held that section IO(b)(3) barred direct judicial review of 
the board's refusal to grant Gabriel conscientious-objector status 
because, unlike the local board's action in Oestereich, such action 
by a local board "inescapably involves a determination of fact and 
an exercise of judgment."115 Gabriel was distinguished from Oeste-
reich on the ground that the board action in Oestereich "was with-
109. 393 U.S. at 243. The difference between Justice Harlan's approach to § 10(b)(3) 
and that of the majority of the Court is that the rationale for Justice Harlan's view 
centers on the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, while that of 
the majority centers on the concept of ripeness. See Donahue, supra note 8, at 934-35. 
ll0. 393 U.S. at 246-48 CTustice Stewart, dissenting, joined by Justices Brennan and 
White). 
Ill. 393 U.S. at 249. Ironically, as the dissenters in Oestereich point out, the harsh-
ness found by the majority would be greater for the registrant alleging an erroneous 
factual determination by his board than for the registrant claiming basically lawless 
board action. The former would bear a larger risk of conviction should he contest 
his classification by defending a criminal prosecution for refusal of induction than 
would the latter. Yet the latter, but not the former, could secure relief prior to in-
duction under the Court's rule. The burden of § 10(b)(3) falls most heavily upon the 
very case that the Court explicitly ruled would be subject to the section's bar-that 
of the conscientious objector considered in Gabriel. The remedy of habeas corpus after 
induction would be unavailable to a sincere conscientious objector since his religious 
beliefs would prevent him from accepting induction under any circumstances. See 
United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246, 248-49 (7th Cir. 1967). 
ll2. 393 U.S. at 250. 
ll3. 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (per curiam), reversing 287 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Cal. 1968). 
114. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Sup_p. IV, 1965-l968). 
U5. 393 U.S. !lt 25!3, 
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out statutory basis and in conflict with petitioner's rights explicitly 
established by statute and not dependent upon an act of judgment 
by the board."116 Since the board in Gabriel had exercised its stat-
utory discretion and evaluated evidence, to allow preinduction 
review of such a determination would be to permit just the kind 
of "litigious interruption" of the selection process that Congress 
sought to prevent by enacting section IO(b)(3).117 
Read together, Oestereich and Gabriel establish a construction 
of section 10(b)(3) that allows preinduction judicial review in cases 
in which the local board's action violates the statute, but prohibits 
such review in cases in which the board acts within its statutory 
authority with respect to a discretionary classification, when such 
classification involves the exercise of board judgment in determin-
ing facts and evaluating evidence. The Court's test is not as judicially 
manageable as it might be. Although a court may easily distinguish 
between those classifications that are mandatory and those that 
are merely permissive, the amount of board fact-finding necessary 
to place a mandatory classification in the Gabriel category rather 
than in the Oestereich exception remains unclear. The Court's 
distinction is in this regard unsatisfactory. Although the conscien-
tious-objector classification involved in Gabriel does require the 
board to determine facts and exercise judgments, the divinity student 
classification involved in Oestereich is similarly dependent upon 
local board discretion and fact-finding,118 notwithstanding the 
Court's statement that it is "not dependent upon an act of judg-
ment by the board."119 
The Court's decisions in Oestereich and Gabriel left unanswered 
many other questions concerning the availability of early review. 
ll6. 393 U.S. at 258. 
II7. 393 U.S. at 258-59. 
ll8. See Selective Serv. Local Bd. Memorandum No. 56 (Aug. 18, 1954), in 
which local boards were instructed concerning the difficult factual judgments required 
in determining entitlement to the divinity student classification. See also Comment, 
supra note 22, at 813-14 n.60, which criticizes the Court's distinction on the ground 
that such board determinations of fact are required with respect to both classifications. 
For a discussion of the difficult determinations a local board is called upon to make 
in deciding claims for the ministerial exemption, see generally Note, Ministerial Ex-
emption from Selective Service System, 19 SYRACUSE L. REv. 996 (1968). For cases 
dealing with the factual issues involved in determining eligibility for the divinity 
student classification, see Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 316-17 
(1946); United States v. McGee, 426 F.2d 691, 694-96 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. 
Bartelt, 200 F.2d 385, 388 (7th Cir. 1952); United States ex rel. Levy v. Cain, 149 F.2d 
338, 341-42 (2d Cir. 1945). See text accompanying notes 146-52 infra. 
ll9. Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256, 258 (1968). For other criticisms of the Court's 
distinction, see Comment, Pre-Induction Judidal Review, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 948, 973 
(1969); The Supreme Court 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 264 (1969). 
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For example, although the rationale used by the Court to dis-
tinguish the two cases indicates a broad exception to the bar to re-
view contained in section IO(b)(3),120 the Court's repeated reference 
to "statutory exemption" as well as its disclaimer that its construction 
"leaves § IO(b)(3) unimpaired in the normal operations of the 
Act,"121 may suggest a narrow interpretation of the section which 
would exclude cases involving deferments.122 Furthermore, the 
two decisions leave open such questions as whether preinduction 
review would be available in a case in which the board's action 
has violated the regulations rather than the statute, or in a chal-
lenge to board procedures rather than classification decisions, or 
in an attack on the constitutionality of the statute itself. 
E. Application of the Supreme Court's Standard 
I. The Exemption-Deferment Distinction 
In the many preinduction suits filed following the Oestereich 
and Gabriel decisions, the Government argued that the Court's 
rule permitting early review should be limited to cases involving 
statutory exemptions. This argument was supported primarily by 
the Court's use of the term "exemption" but not of the term 
"deferment" in its opinion in Oestereich.123 Although some of the 
courts of appeals adopted the Government's distinction,124 most 
rejected it,125 and in Breen v. Selective Service Local Board Number 
16,126 decided January 26, 1970, the Supreme Court concluded that 
there were no "practical or legal differences between exemptions and 
120. See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text. 
121. 393 U.S. at 238. 
122. But see Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 2!1!1, 249 
n.9 (1968) Gustice Stewart, dissenting): "The Court seems to limit its holding to 
statutory 'exemptions'; yet 'deferments' may just as 'plainly' preclude a registrant's 
induction." 
12!1. See Anderson v. Hershey, 410 F.2d 492, 494 (6th Cir, 1969), vacated and re-
manded, 397 U.S. 47 (1970) (finding a "repeated confinement" of the Court's ruling to 
exemptions): Brief for the Respondents at 17, Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 
16, !196 U.S. 460 (1970). 
124. United States v. Troutman, 412 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 
397 U.S. 48 (1970), revd. on remand, 425 F.2d 261 (1970); Anderson v. Hershey, 410 
F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 47 (1970); Kraus v. Selective 
Serv. Sys. Local 25, 408 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 47 
(1970). 
125. Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Worstell, 
419 F.2d 762 (lid Cir. 1969); Carey v. Local Bd. No. 2, 412 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1969) (per 
curiam) (by implication); Bowen v. Hershey, 410 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1969); Foley v. 
Hershey, 409 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (by implication): Rich v. Hershey, 
408 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1969). 
126. !196 U.S. 460 (1970). 
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deferments,"127 and extended the Oestereich rule to cover cases in-
volving deferments.12B 
It was not surprising that the Court in Oestereich had referred 
exclusively to exemptions, for the divinity student classification at 
issue in that case was an exemption.129 Although the Solicitor Gen-
eral's brief in Oestereich had urged the Court to limit the proposed 
exception to section IO(b)(3) to exemptions,130 the Court's opinion 
did not address itself to the question whether its rule should be so 
limited. Rather than adopting a distinction between exemptions, 
which were involved in both Oestereich and Gabriel,131 and defer-
ments, which were not at issue in either case, the Court rested both 
cases on the distinction between mandatory classifications which 
are explicitly required by the statute (Oestereich) and discretion-
ary classifications which call for the exercise of local board judg-
ment in determining facts and evaluating evidence (Gabriel). 
The Court in Breen explicitly rejected the Attorney General's 
argument132 that the Oestereich exception to section IO(b)(3) 
127. 396 U.S. at 466. 
128. The Court permitted review in a preinduction case involving the under-
graduate-student deferment required by 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968). 
129. Section 6(g) of the Act provides that "students preparing for the ministry" in 
qualified schools "shall be exempt from training and service • • • ." 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 456(g) (1964). 
130. The Government argued that the Court's rule "need not extend to persons 
who are deferred • • • because they remain liable for service and training, with only 
the time of service subject to adjustment." Brief for the Respondents at 65, Oestereich 
v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968). The Director of Selective 
Service, however, in a memorandum filed in the Oestereich case, took the position, 
contrary to that of the Solicitor General, that "there is little, if any, distinction be-
tween a case in which a registrant claims the right to complete his course of study in 
a theological school under a statutory exemption and the case of an undergraduate 
student pursuing any other course who claims a right to a statutory deferment to 
complete his baccalaureate studies,'' and that "a statutory provision authorizing de-
ferment is as binding as one which authorizes exemption." Memorandum from Lt. 
Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Dir. of Selective Serv. at 4-5, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. 
Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968). 
131. Although the statute describes conscientious objection as an exemption, 50 
U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), as does the Selective Service System's Special 
Form for Conscientious Objector, SSS Form No. 150 (Aug. 30, 1968), this status is 
unlike the other classifications which are designated exemptions. Classification as a 
conscientious objector is not a determination of whether or not a registrant shall 
serve, but rather of the type of service he will perform. Conscientious objectors are 
placed either in class I-A-O, the noncombatant military service classification, 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1622.11 (1970), or in class I-O, the civilian alternative service classification, 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1622,14 (1970). 
132. The Solicitor General had refused to sign the Government's brief in Breen, 
which was prepared by the Attorney General. This was the first time that a Solicitor 
General had refused to sign a government brief since 1955. 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. NEWS• 
LETIEJt 33 (1969). 
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should apply only to exemptions. The Court found it misleading 
to regard an exemption as a removal of liability for service but a 
deferment as merely a postponement of such liability. Those "ex-
empted" are no more immune from military service than those 
"deferred." Both types of classification are based on the status of 
the individual. As long as his status remains unchanged, the regis-
trant is effectively immune from service whether his classification 
is called a "deferment" or an "exemption," since the Act provides 
that no deferred or exempted registrant may be inducted.133 "No 
classification is permanent,"134 however, and the Act requires that 
no exemption or deferment "shall continue after the cause therefor 
ceases to exist."135 Thus, as soon as his status changes, the registrant 
again becomes liable for service whether his previous classification 
was labeled a "deferment" or an "exemption."136 The undergrad-
uate student given a II-S "deferment" and the divinity student 
given a IV-D "exemption" alike become liable for induction 
should they both become graduate students in history after grad-
uation from their respective schools.137 
The only difference between exemptions and deferments un-
der the selective service law is that the latter, but not the former, 
extend a registrant's liability for service from age twenty-six to age 
thirty-five.138 But this is a technical difference only, since under 
the present order of call a registrant over the age of twenty-six 
whose liability has been extended will not be ordered for induc-
tion unless there is a total national mobilization.139 The distinc-
tion drawn by the statute is of questionable validity even for the 
limited purpose of determining whether a registrant's liability has 
133. 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a)(l) (Supp. 
IV, 1965-1968). 
134. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.1(1) (1970). See Selective Serv. Local Bd. Memorandum 
No. 55 (Jan. 25, 1957) (calling for a periodic review of classifications). 
135. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(k) (1964). 
136. See United States v. Stewart, 306 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. JQ.69), appeal dis 
missed, 396 U.S. 1066 (1970). 
137. See Turley v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 134, 301 F. Supp. 845, 852-53 
(C.D. Cal. 1969). Both exemptions and deferments may also be waived or abandoned 
by the registrant. Pickens v. Cox, 282 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1960) (exemption); United 
States v. Norman, 301 F. Supp. 53, 59 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), afjd, 413 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 
1969) (deferment). 
138. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. 
IV, 1965-1968). See Selective Serv. Local Bd. Memorandum No. 38 (Feb. 19, 1965). 
139. See 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7(a) (1970); Selective Serv. Local Bd. Memorandum No. 67 
(Sept. 20, 1966). These regulations establish the random-selection system, and place 
those over the age of twenty-six fifth in order of call, a category that will not be reached, 
given the present manpower needs of the Department of Defense and the pool of 
available men in categories lower than five, unless there is a total national mobilization. 
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been extended. Why should an elected offi.cia1140 be subject to ex-
tended liability while a divinity student141 is not? Why should the 
classification given a member of ROTC142 be termed a deferment, 
while that given a cadet at a military academy143 is called an ex-
emption? The designation of some classifications as deferments and 
others as exemptions appears arbitrary. Moreover, some classifica-
tions are not designated as either exemptions or deferments,144 and 
some appear to be neither.145 Thus, the Court's decision in Breen 
to reject an exemption-deferment distinction and to extend the 
Oestereich rule to deferments seems to be proper. 
The key to the Oestereich rule, as enunciated by the Supreme 
Court, is whether the classification at issue is a clear statutory man-
date preventing any exercise of discretion by the board. Whatever 
distinction there is between exemptions and deferments is simply 
irrelevant in applying this rule. As the Court found in Breen, many 
exemptions are not absolute;146 and, as the dissenting opinion in 
Oestereich pointed out, deferments "may just as 'plainly' preclude 
a registrant's induction" as exemptions.147 Indeed, some deferments 
are more "mandatory" than are some exemptions.148 The IV-D ex-
emption for divinity students found in Oestereich to be "plain and 
140. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(£) (1964). 
141. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (1964). 
142. Reserve Officer Training Corps, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(d)(I) (1964). 
143. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(a) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(a)(I) (Supp. 
IV, 1965-1968). 
144. E.g., 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(0) (1964) (sole surviving son). 
145. E.g., 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(a) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(a)(2) 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968) (members of the Public Health Service). 
146. 396 U.S. at 467. 
147. 393 U.S. at 249 n.9 ijustice Stewart, dissenting). 
148. Those exempt include ministers and ministerial students (class IV-D), 50 U.S.C. 
App. § 456(g) (1964) and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.43 (1970); veterans of military service (class 
IV-A), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(b) (1964) and 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.40(a)(l)-(9) (1970); and 
conscientious objectors (classes I-O and I-A-O), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456G) (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968), amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 456G) (1964), and 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.11, 1622.14 
(1970). Those with mandatory deferments which are as clearly provided for as 
exemptions include undergraduate students (class II-S), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(I) 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968) and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25 (1970); students deferred to complete 
the academic year (class I·S), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(i) (1964) and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.15 
(1970); certain elected officials (class IV-B), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(£) (1964) and 32 
C.F.R. § 1622.41 (1970); and aviation cadet applicants (class 1-D), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(e) 
(1964) and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.lll(c) (1970). Those deferments calling for the exercise of 
local board judgment include occupational deferments (class II-A), 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 456(h) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), and 32 
C.F.R. § 1622.22 (1970), and dependency deferments (class III-A), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) 
(1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), and 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1622.30 (1970). 
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unequivocal"149 and in Gabriel to be "not dependent upon an act 
of judgment by the Board"150 involves a great deal of local board 
discretion and fact-finding.151 By contrast, the IV-B deferment 
given the Vice President of the United States is unconditional and 
does not call for any exercise of board discretion.152 
By rejecting an exemption-deferment distinction, the Court 
widened the Oestereich exception to section 10(b)(3). As restated 
in Breen, the exception applies to all cases in which a board has 
ordered a registrant to report for military service when that regis-
trant "was required by the relevant law not to be inducted."153 
2. Review of Local Board Classification Decisions 
a. The 1-S cases. Some of the earliest cases to interpret the 
Oestereich rule involved the I-S deferment granted certain univer-
sity students to complete the academic year in which they are or-
dered for induction.154 Although section 6(i)(2) of the Act155 clearly 
149. 393 U.S. at 238. 
150. 393 U.S. at 258. 
151. See note 118 supra. 
152. "The Vice President of the United States ••• shall, while holding ••• [office], 
be deferred from training and service •••. " 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(£) (1964). 
153. 396 U.S. at 467. 
154. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(i) (1964); 32 C.F.R. § 1622.15 (1970). The I-S deferment 
was created to avoid the hardship and waste of an interrupted academic year and to 
provide students with "an opportunity to enlist in a branch of service of their choice 
during such deferment period." H.R. REP. No. 271, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1951). 
155. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(i)(2) (1964). This section provides: 
Any person who while satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction 
at a college, university, or similar institution is ordered to report for induction ••• 
shall ••• be deferred (A) until the end of such academic year, or (B) until he 
ceases satisfactorily to pursue such course of instruction, whichever is the earlier 
There are four exceptions to the requirement of § 6(i)(2). The first two, contained as 
provisos to § 6(i)(2), apply only to registrants who received certain postponements and 
deferments under the Selective Service Act of 1948 from 1948 to 1951. The third, also 
a proviso to § 6(i)(2), states that no registrant may receive more than one I-S deferment 
in his lifetime. The fourth exception, contained in the fourth sentence of § 6(h)(l) of 
the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), amending 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 456(h) (1964), applies to registrants who have been deferred as undergraduates after 
June 30, 1967, and have received their baccalaureate degrees. Full-time graduate students 
who completed their undergradute degrees prior to June 30, 1967, and who have not 
previously been classified I-S would thus be entitled to deferment in class I-S if they 
received induction orders during the academic year. See generally Griffiths & Heckman, 
Eligibility for 1-S of Registrants Holding Graduate 11-S Since July 1, 1967, I SEL. SERV. 
L. REP. 4041 (1968); Comment, Eligibility of Graduate Students for Student and Father-
hood Draft Deferments, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 617 (1969); Comment, Selective Service 
Law-Student Deferments-Graduate Student Held To Have Right to 1-S Deferment 
Under Selective Service Act of 1967 Despite Prior II-S Classification, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1049 (1969). Undergraduates who either do not request or are not entitled to the II-S 
student deferment and who are ordered for induction during the school year are also 
entitled to a I-S classification provided they have never before been so deferred. E.g., 
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requires that graduate students who had not held an undergradu-
ate II-S deferment after June 30, 1967, be granted a I-S deferment 
until the end of the academic year, the Director of Selective Ser-
vice, in a local board memorandum, had excluded such graduate 
students from classification as I-S.1156 As a result of the Director's 
memorandum, local boards refused to grant a I-S deferment to such 
students who had been ordered for induction. Within two months 
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Oestereich and Gabriel, such 
students filed cases in district courts throughout the country in 
which they sought to have their inductions enjoined and to be re-
classified I-S. 
The district courts were faced with the question whether sec-
tion I0(b)(3) of the Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
would permit such preinduction actions. Virtually all of the courts 
took a broad view of the Oestereich exception to section IO(b)(3)'s 
restriction on direct review. Although the I-S cases presented a dif-
ficult question of statutory construction, and although some courts 
concluded that the deferment was discretionary,1157 the vast major-
ity of courts found an absolute statutory right to the I-S defer-
ment.1158 Reading Oestereich to authorize preinduction review 
when the classification sought was made mandatory by the statute, 
the courts generally granted relief.1159 
b. The 11-S cases. The II-S deferment for college students has 
also been the subject of several preinduction suits. Unlike the I-S 
deferment, which permits the student to complete his academic 
Turley v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 134, 301 F. Supp. 845 (C.D. Cal. 1969): 
Walsh v. Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
156. See Selective Serv. Local Bd. Memorandum No. 87 (April 19, 1968), which 
precluded from the I·S classification not only students who received undergraduate 
II-S deferments after June 30, 1967, but also students who received graduate II-S 
deferments after that date. 
157. E.g., Rich v. Hershey, 408 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1969); Green v. Hershey, 298 
F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Va. 1969); Rosenfield v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 19, 298 
F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Pa. 1969). Many of the courts that found the I-S deferment dis-
cretionary indicated that review would lie under Oestereich had they found the de-
ferment mandatory instead. E.g., Davis v. Hershey, 310 F. Supp. 565 (C.D. Cal. 1969), 
appeal dismissed, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3230 (9th Cir. 1970). 
158. E.g., Bowen v. Hershey, 410 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1969); Armendariz v. Hershey, 
295 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 413 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1969); Ellis 
v. Hershey, 302 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Mich. 1969). 
159. E.g., Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam): Foley v. 
Hershey, 409 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Carey v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. 
No. 2, 297 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn.), a/fd., 412 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1969); Hardenbergh v. 
Selective Serv. Sys., 2 SEL. SERV, L. REP. 3315 (D. Minn. 1969). For courts granting 
preinduction relief in cases involving undergraduate students entitled to the I-S 
deferment, see cases cited in note 155 supra. 
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year and is available only after receipt of an induction order,160 
the II-S is the widespread student deferment designed to enable 
the student to complete an entire course of study found necessary 
to the national interest.161 Prior to the 1967 amendments, the II-S 
deferment had been awarded within the discretion of the local 
board for both undergraduate and graduate students.162 The new 
Act, while leaving the graduate II-S deferment discretionary,163 
made the II-S mandatory for undergraduates "satisfactorily pursu-
ing a full-time course of instruction at a college, university, or 
similar institution."164 
Several preinduction cases involving II-S deferments arose out 
of the delinquency reclassification of deferred students for antiwar 
activities. Since the II-S deferment for graduate students is autho-
rized rather than required by the statute, and is within the discre-
tion of the local board, some courts have held that preinduction 
160. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(i) (1964). 
161. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456{h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25 (1970). 
162. The former section, Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 624, § 6{h), 62 Stat. 604, 
611-12, gave the President discretion to provide for student deferments. The President 
exercised this authority by authorizing, but not requiring, local boards to place most 
undergraduate and graduate students in class II-S. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25 (1966). 
163. New § 6(h)(2), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), leaves 
the deferment of graduate students entirely within the President's discretion. Congress 
expected that the President would severely curtail the categories of graduate study 
that would be deferable. See S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967); H.R. REP. 
No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1967). The President did in fact curtail these cate-
gories with new regulations, promulgated simultaneously with the passage of the new 
Act, which eliminated all graduate-student deferments except for fields of study iden-
tified by the Director of Selective Service on advice of the National Security Council. 
Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.26(a) (1970). Some months thereafter, the 
National Security Council declined to identify any such fields. See Selective Serv. 
Local Bd. Memorandum No. 85 (April 19, 1968). 
164. The text of 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) reads: 
• • • the President shall, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, 
provide for the deferment ••• of persons satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course 
of instruction at a college, university, or similar institution . • • • A deferment 
granted to any ••. [such] person ••. shall continue until such person completes 
the requirements for his baccalaureate degree, fails to pursue satisfactorily a 
full-time course of instruction, or attains the twenty-fourth anniversary of the 
date of his birth, whichever first occurs. Student deferments provided for under 
this paragraph may be substantially restricted or terminated by the President 
only upon a finding by him that the needs of the Armed Forces require such action. 
Although the report of the Marshall Commission had recommended by a closely 
divided vote the abolition of all student deferments {NATL. ADVISORY COMMN. ON SELEC-
TIVE SERV., IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? 43 (1967}), the 
Clark Panel had urged that undergraduate-student deferments be made mandatory 
(CIVILIAN ADVISORY PANEL ON MILITARY MANPOWER RECRUITMENT, 90th CONG., 1st SESS., 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES 11-12 (Comm. Print 1967)), and 
Congress, after hearings and debate, adopted the view of the Clark Panel. H.R. REP. 
No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-12 (1967). See H. MARMION, SELECTIVE SERVICE: CON• 
FLICT AND COMPROMISE 123-34, 140, 142-43, 153-54 (1968). 
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judicial review does not, under the Oestereich rule, extend to 
claims involving the deferment of graduate students.165 Since the 
undergraduate-student deferment is statutorily required, however, 
the Supreme Court in Breen held that the Oestereich rule permits 
preinduction review of the removal of that deferment.166 
The lower court in Breen161 had based its decision to deny pre-
induction review on the language of section 6(h)(l), which provides 
for the student deferment "under such rules and regulations as ... 
[the President] may prescribe."168 This language, the Second Cir-
cuit found, authorized the President to provide for the removal of 
the deferment on a declaration of delinquency.169 The Supreme 
Court rejected the approach of the court of appeals on the ground 
that section 6(h)(l) provides that an undergraduate-student defer-
ment, once granted, shall continue until the registrant graduates, 
fails to pursue satisfactorily a full-time course of instruction, or 
reaches his twenty-fourth birthday,170 and the Government did not 
contend that Breen had lost his deferment for any of these statutory 
reasons.171 The "rules and regulations" language relied on by the 
court below was found by the Supreme Court merely to authorize 
the President to prescribe procedures for the granting of the defer-
ment. The President's authority was not meant to extend to the 
removal of the deferment for activities unrelated to its statutory 
conditions.172 Moreover, the Court noted, the third sentence of 
section 6(h)(l) qualifies the President's rule-making power by pro-
viding that undergraduate deferments may be restricted or termi-
165. Kolden v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 4, 406 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1969), vacated 
and remanded, 397 U.S. 47 (1970); Dickens v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. 
Iowa 1969). 
166. Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970). Several cases 
had reache'1, the same conclusion prior to the Court's decision in Breen. Bucher v. 
Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 2, 421 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1970); Stevenson v. Selective 
Serv. Local Bd. No. 62, 303 F. Supp. 1254 (YI .D. Wis. 1969); United States v. Stewart, 
306 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 1066 (1970); Kimball v. 
Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 15, 283 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See Kolden v. Selec-
tive Serv. Local Bd. No. 4, 406 F.2d 631, 635 (8th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 
U.S. 47 (1970) (dictum). Contra, Vasilj v. Local Bd. No. 134, 422 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 
1969); Anderson v. Hershey, 410 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1969) (2-1 decision) (adopting the 
exemption-deferment distinction), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 47 (1970); Schwartz 
v. Local Bd. No. 23, Selective Serv. Sys., 298 F. Supp. 1238 (Y'/.D. Ky. 1969). 
167. 406 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969) (2-1 decision). 
168. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
169. 406 F .2d at 638. 
170. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
171. 396 U.S. at 464 n.4. 
172. 396 U.S. at 464-66. 
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nated only upon a finding by the President that the needs of the 
Army require such action. 173 Since the President had made no such 
finding of need, the Court refused to uphold the delinquency reg-
ulations under the rule-making power provided in section 6(h)(l).m 
Since the Supreme Court found the undergraduate-student 
deferment to be required by the statute, the Court further con-
cluded that Oestereich was controlling in Breen and permitted 
early review. 
c. Other cases challenging classification decisions. The broad 
interpretation of Oestereich given by the lower federal courts and 
by the Supreme Court in Breen has called for judicial scrutiny of 
the classification to which the registrant claims entitlement. If the 
classification sought is statutorily required, then preinduction re-
view will lie under Oestereich. Direct review should thus be per-
mitted in cases involving the exemption granted sole surviving 
sons,175 the exemption provided for ministers of religion,176 and the 
deferment granted certain public officials.177 
On the other hand, if the classification is committed by statute 
to the discretion of the local board or requires the board to exercise 
its fact-finding function, then judicial review prior to induction 
will remain unavailable. Accordingly, direct review will not lie in 
cases involving a local board refusal to grant the occupational defer-
ment178 or the dependency deferment for extreme hardship.179 
173. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
174. 396 U.S. at 465 n.5. The Court also rejected, on the authority of Gutknecht v. 
United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970), the contention that deliquency induction was au-
thorized by Congress. 396 U.S. at 465-66. One court, in a case decided subsequent to 
Breen, has declined to grant preinduction review of a claim involving a student at a 
state vocational school since such a school is not plainly a "similar institution of 
learning" within the meaning of § 6(h)(l). Evans v. Local Bd. No. 73, 425 F.2d 323 
(10th Cir. 1970). 
175. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(0) (1964); 32 C.F.R. § 1622.40(a)(l0) (1970) (class IV-A). 
See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 203-04 (1969) Gustice Douglas, concurring) 
(dictum). 
176. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (1964); 32 C.F.R. § 1622.43 (1970) (class IV-D). 
177. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(£) (1964); 32 C.F.R. § 1622.41 (1970) (class IV-B). 
178. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. 
IV, 1965-1968); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.22 (class II-A), 1622.24 (class II-C) (1970). See 
Edwards v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. 111, 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3391 (N.D. Cal. 1969) 
(dictum). See also Shiffman v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 5, I SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3082 (2d 
Cir.), application for stay denied, 391 U.S. 930 (1968) (decided pre-Oestereich), 
cited with approval in Anderson v. Hershey, 410 F.2d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 1969), 
vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 47 (1970). 
179. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30(b) (1970) (class III-A). Since the III-A classification for 
hardship is conditioned on a judgment that the registrant's deferment is "advisable," 
50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968), several courts have held that the denial of the deferment does not entitle 
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Several classifications, although not required by the statute, are 
made mandatory by the regulations. The Oestereich rule, as re-
stated by the Court in Breen, permits direct review whenever the 
registrant is "required by the relevant law not to be inducted."180 
Since the regulations are a significant part of the relevant law, such 
review should be available in cases involving classifications which, 
although only authorized by the statute, are required by the regu-
lations. Accordingly, it has been held that the fatherhood deferment, 
which is mandatory under the regulations although merely autho-
rized by the statute,181 is within the Breen reformulation of the 
Oestereich rule.182 The same rationale should apply to permit pre-
induction review of claims involving the failure to reclassify those 
registrants who are found to be physically, mentally, or morally 
unfit for service,188 and of claims involving the now-mandatory II-A 
deferment for those enrolled in junior colleges, trade schools, or ap-
prenticeship-training programs.184 In an analogous situation, several 
courts have held that direct review is available in cases involving an 
exemption required by a treaty, similarly a part of the relevant 
law.1ss 
the registrant to direct review. Gee v. Smith, 306 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Ferro v. 
United States, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3260 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
180. Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460, 467 (1970). 
181. Compare 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) with 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1622.30(a) (1970) (class III-A). A recent amendment to the regulations restricts manda-
tory fatherhood deferments to those requested prior to April 23, 1970. Exec. Order 
No. 11,527, 35 Fed. Reg. 6571 (1970). 
182. Shea v. Mitchell, 421 F.2d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Gregory v. Hershey, 311 F. 
Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969). 
183. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. 
IV, 1965-1968); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.17 (class I-Y), 1622.44 (class IV-F) (1970). Although 
only authorized by the statute, these deferments are required by the regulations for a 
registrant found unqualified for service in the Armed Forces under applicable physical, 
mental, and moral standards. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.17, 1622.44 (1970). The determination of 
acceptability is made by the Army itself, not by the Selective Service System. Following 
an Armed Forces physical examination (see 32 C.F.R. §§ 1628.10-.25 (1970); Army Reg. 
40-501 C22, chs. 1, 2, 9 (Dec. 5, 1960); Army Reg. 601-270 C2, chs. 1-5 (Feb. 13, 1967)), 
the Army sends the local board a statement of acceptability, DD Form No. 62 (March 
1, 1959), indicating whether or not the registrant has been found acceptable. A 
registrant contesting his acceptability for service would clearly be subject to the bar 
of § 10(b)(3), Costa Elena v. President of the United States, 288 F. Supp. 383 (D.P.R. 
1968). But a registrant found unqualified by the Army should be able to bring suit to 
compel his deferment if the local board disregards the regulations and refuses to re-
classify him. See Bucher v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 2, 421 F.2d 24, 37 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 1970) (opinion of Judge Van Dusen, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
184. See 32 C.F.R. § 1622.22(b) (1970). 
185. Vasquez v. Attorney General, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3240 (9th Cir. 1970); Itzcovitz 
v. Selective Serv. Sys. Bd. No. 6, 301 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 3 
SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3063 (2d Cir. 1970). 
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3. Review of Local Board Procedures 
Several preinduction suits have challenged the procedures used 
by local boards in the classification process. The selective service 
regulations prescribe the procedures that local boards are to follow in 
the classification and processing of registrants.186 Although Oeste-
reich dealt with a local board classification decision found to be 
basically lawless, the Court's rationale in that case should extend 
as well to cases involving any board action that violates either the 
statute or the regulations.187 If a local board fails to follow a pro-
cedure required by the relevant law, such action is just as lawless 
as a board's failure to award a registrant a classification to which he 
is legally entitled.1SS 
In several recent decisions, courts have adopted this view, and 
have refused to dismiss preinduction suits challenging board pro-
cedures which violated statutory requirements. One group of these 
decisions involves the delinquency regulations189 which were recently 
invalidated by the Supreme Court in Gutknecht v. United States.190 
Pursuant to these regulations, many registrants had been declared 
delinquent by their local boards, reclassified I-A, and ordered for 
priority induction. The Gutknecht decision clearly made such sum-
mary processing unlawful. Therefore, the courts have held that any 
registrant so reclassified or ordered inducted under the now illegal 
procedures is entitled to obtain preinduction judicial relief.191 
186. See note l!O supra. 
187. The Court's favorable citation in Oestereich of Townsend v. Zimmerman, 2l!7 
F.2d l!76 (6th Cir. 1956) (see note l!7 supra and accompanying text), a case involving 
the denial of a registrant's appeal rights in violation of the regulations, supports 
such an extension. 39l! U.S. 2l!3, 238 (1968). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion also 
supports the extension: "[A] challenge to the validity of the administrative procedure 
itself not only renders irrelevant the presumption of regularity, but also presents an 
issue beyond the competence of the Selective Service Boards to hear and determine." 
l!9l! U.S. at 242. 
188. See Comment, Administrative Law-Selective Service-Pre-Induction Judicial 
Review Held Unavailable to Registrant Claiming Statutory Deferment, 44 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 804, 811 (1969). But see Edwards v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 111, 2 SEL. SERv. 
L. REP. l!l!91 (N.D. Cal. 1969). Board failure to follow procedural regulations designed 
for the protection of the registrant may be a denial of due process of law. See Walsh 
v. Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, l!59 U.S. 
5l!5 (1959); Service v. Dulles, S54 U.S. l!6l! (1957). 
189. Delinquency is provided for in l!2 C.F.R. §§ 1642.1-.46 (1970). 
190. l!96 U.S. 295 (1970). As a result of Gutknecht, local boards have been ordered 
to suspend all processing of delinquents. Selective Serv. Local Bd. Memorandum 
No. 101 (Jan. 21, 1970). 
191. Shea v. Mitchell, 421 F.2d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1970); McMillen v. Mitchell, 2 SEL. 
SERV, L. REP. l!464 (7th Cir. 1970). In Kolden v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 4, 397 
U.S. 47 (1970), the Supreme Court vacated the judgments in several cases involving 
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There have been other cases involving various local board pro-
cedural irregularities in violation of the regulations. In one case, 
direct preinduction review was permitted because the board had 
engaged in several examples of what the court called "regulatory 
lawlessness."192 The local board had violated the regulations by 
failing to vote on a request for reopening following a board 
meeting.193 The board had also infringed the registrant's due pro-
cess rights by considering a memorandum placed in his file by a 
Selective Service official without advising him of the memorandum 
and providing him an opportunity to rebut its allegations. In addi-
tion, the board had violated the regulations by subsequently re-
moving the same memorandum from the registrant's file.194 
In Wiener v. Local Board Number 4,195 the plaintiff's local board 
had granted him an occupational deferment as a teacher, and the State 
Director, who had urged local boards to limit teaching deferments 
to one year, appealed the classification.196 When the plaintiff was 
informed that his classification was being appealed, he requested an 
appointment with a government appeal agent.197 The local board 
granted his request. Several days before the day on which the ap-
pointment was scheduled, however, the plaintiff's file was forwarded 
to the state appeal board. The state board met the next day and 
reclassified the plaintiff I-A. The court held that this procedure 
deprived the plaintiff of the right to be heard by the appeal board-
a right found to be implicit in the regulations-and remanded the 
case to the appeal board for reconsideration.198 
delinquency reclassifications and remanded them to their respective courts of appeals 
for reconsideration in light of Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 
(1970). 
192. Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038, 1058 (D.R.!. 1969). See O'Neil, 
Public Employment, Antiwar Protest and Preinduction Review, 17 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1028 
(1970). 
19ll. ll2 C.F.R. § 1604.52a(d) (1970) requires such a vote. In a case involving a some-
what similar issue, the court held that preinduction review was warranted where the 
local board had failed to meet and consider the plaintiff's claim for a deferment. 
Edwards v. Local Bd. No. 58, 313 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Finding the board's 
failure a violation of the requirement implicit in 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3(b) (1970), the 
court held that it had jurisdiction to enjoin plaintiff's induction despite § 10(b)(3) of 
the Act. 313 F. Supp. at 651-52. 
194. ll2 C.F.R. § 1621.8 (1970) requires that "every paper pertaining to the registrant 
••• shall be filed in his Cover Sheet •••• " 
195. ll02 F. Supp. 266 (D. Del. 1969). 
196. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.l (1970) permits a state director to appeal determinations 
of a local board at any time. 
197. See ll2 C.F.R. § 1604.71 (1970). 
198. 302 F. Supp. at 270. 
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In another case involving a regulatory violation,199 the plaintiff 
had reported for induction but was found medically unacceptable 
by the Army. His local board again ordered him for induction one 
month later, however, and plaintiff filed suit challenging the validity 
of that induction order. The court found that the board's action 
violated the regulation requiring the board to reclassify a registrant 
found unqualified at induction.200 Since this regulation was manda-
tory, the court entertained plaintiff's preinduction suit and enjoined 
his induction. 
In still another case, 201 a court enjoined the induction of a reg-
istrant under an induction order that had been issued prior to 
the institution of the random-selection-sequence system and which 
had then been invalidly postponed until after that time. Since the 
action of the board was contrary to the regulation dealing with 
postponement of induction,202 the court held that it had jurisdiction 
to enjoin the registrant's induction until such time as his sequence 
number was reached in the regular order of call. 
Although local board failure to follow a required procedure 
should thus entitle a registrant to judicial relief prior to induction, 
such relief should be denied when the procedure involved is autho-
rized rather than required by the regulations,203 or when the board 
action challenged involves an exercise of the fact-finding function 
which the Court found in the Gabriel case to be subject to section 
10(b)(3).204 Accordingly, several courts have dismissed preinduction 
199. Rich v. Hershey, 303 F. Supp. 177 (D. Colo.), afjd., 408 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 
1969). 
200. 32 C.F.R. § 1632.30 (1970). The regulation was enacted pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 
App. § 453(a) (1964), which provides: "No person shall be inducted into the Armed 
Forces . • . until his acceptability in all respects, including his physical and mental 
fitness, has been satisfactorily determined under standards prescribed by the Secretary 
of Defense. • • ." 
201. Liese v. Local Bd. No. 102, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3688 (E.D. Mo. 1970). 
202. 32 C.F.R. § 1632.2 (1970). 
203. See Mulligan v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 64, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3686 
(E.D.N.Y. 1970) (board failure to follow nonmandatory procedures relating to physical 
examination held not to entitle registrant to preinduction judicial review). 
204. See Green v. Local Bd. No. 87, 419 F.2d 813 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 
1059 (1970), in which the court held that a preinduction challenge to the validity of an 
induction order, on the ground that the plaintiff had been ordered for induction out of 
the required order of call, did not fall within the Oestereich exception to § 10(b)(3). The 
regulations specify the order in which registrants classified I-A or I-A-0 and who have 
been found acceptable for service shall be selected and ordered to report for induction, 
32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1970), and congressional authorization is required to change the or-
der of call, 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a)(2} (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) amending 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 455(a) (1964). Failure to follow the required order of call invalidates the induction 
order, and is a defense to a criminal prosecution for refusal of induction. United States 
v. Baker, 416 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1969); United Stat<:$ v. Lybrand, 279 F. Supp. 74 
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actions challenging local board refusals to reopen a registrant's 
classification.205 The regulations provide that the board "may reopen 
and consider anew the classification of a registrant . . . upon the 
written request of the registrant ... if such request is accompanied 
by written information presenting facts not considered when the 
registrant was classified, which, if true, would justify a change in 
the registrant's classification."206 The right to have a classification 
reopened is especially important to the registrant since this entitles 
him to all the appeal rights and other procedural consequences 
that attach to an initial classification.207 While the regulation is 
not mandatory on its face, the courts have held that reopening is 
required if the registrant presents information which establishes a 
prima fade case of qualification for the classification to which he 
claims entitlement.208 In order to decide whether a prima fade 
case has been presented, a court would have to review the registrant's 
Selective Service file to determine whether the board erred in the 
(E.D.N.Y. 1967). The plaintiff in Green had alleged that ten registrants of his local 
board who were classified I-A and were older than he had not been called for induc-
tion. The court's decision, affirming the dismissal of Green's suit to enjoin his induction 
(!Ut of the order of call, confuses postponement of induct:on with issuance of the 
induction order, and implies that the order of call is discretionary-an implication that 
is clearly wrong. See Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970). The result reached 
by the court can be justified, however, on the ground that the determination whether 
a registrant has been inducted in the proper order would require the court to review 
the files of other registrants of the local board to decide whether they had been placed 
in the proper category of call. Such judicial review of board fact-finding is clearly 
within the prohibition of § 10(b)(3) as interpreted by the Court in Gabriel. See text 
accompanying notes 113-17 supra. 
205. Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 38 
U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. June 10, 1970); Brookout v. Thomas, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 
3230 (9th Cir. 1970); Sloan v. Local Bd. No. 1, 414 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1969); 
Gabel v. Hershey, 308 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Va. 1970); Ryan v. Hershey, 308 F. 
Supp. 285 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Reisner v. Lonsdorf, 306 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1969); 
Gee v. Smith, 306 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Grosfeld v. Morris, 303 F. Supp. 227 
(D. Md. 1969). Contra, Hunt v. Local Bd. No. 197, 423 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1970); 
Lane v. Local Bd. No. 17, No. 70-913-G (D. Mass. Aug. 4, 1970); Murray v. 
Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.!. 1969); Barker v. Hershey, 309 F. Supp. 277 
(W.D. Wis. 1969); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.!. 1969). 
206. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1970). The board may not reopen, however, after it has 
mailed an induction order, unless it first finds that there has been a change in the 
registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which he had no control. Id. The 
Supreme Court recently agreed to consider the effect of this provision in a case in-
volving a postinduction-order conscientious-objector claim. Ehlert v. United States, 
422 F.2d 332 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970). 
207. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1625.11-.13 (1970). See Mulloy v. United States, 38 U.S.L.W. 4509 
(U.S. June 15, 1970). 
208. E.g., Mulloy v. United States, 38 U.S.L.W. 4509 (U.S. June 15, 1970); 
Davis v. United States, 410 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1969); Robertson v. United States, 404 
F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1968), revd. en bane, 417 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. 
Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967). 
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application of the prima facie standard. If the classification sought 
is a mandatory one not involving board fact-finding, and is there-
fore within the Oestereich exception to section IO(b)(3), then pre-
induction review should be permitted in cases in which the board 
has refused to reopen. In such cases, judicial review of the question 
whether a prima facie claim has been presented would involve less 
time and therefore less interruption of the selection process than 
would review of the question whether a registrant is entitled to the 
classification he seeks. On the other hand, when the classification 
sought is dependent upon board evaluation of evidence, direct re-
view of a refusal by the board to reopen should be unavailable. 
Since a board decision not to reopen in such a case entails an evalu-
ation of the evidence presented and an exercise of judgment in 
determining whether a prima facie claim for a new classification has 
been established, such a decision "inescapably involves a determi-
nation of fact and an exercise of judgment" within the meaning of 
Gabriel.209 Accordingly, preinduction review has been denied in 
several cases involving refusals to reopen in which the registrant 
sought either classification as a conscientious objector210 or defer-
ment for extreme hardship of dependents.211 
A slightly different question from that involved in those cases 
contesting local board action is presented by the cases that raise a 
general challenge to the validity of the statute, the regulations, or 
official policies or procedures of the Selective Service System. Since 
such cases do not seek to review the "classification or processing of 
any registrant,''212 they do not fall within the literal terms of section 
IO(b)(3). Moreover, since such cases do not attack the classification 
of any individual, they do not constitute the "litigious interruptions" 
of the recruitment process that section IO(b)(3) was intended to 
prevent.213 Accordingly, an attack challenging the validity on its 
face of the statute or of a regulation or other Selective Service pro-
209. 393 U.S. 256, 258 (1968). 
210. Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1969), petition for cert. filed, 38 
U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. June 10, 1970); Sloan v. Local Bd. No. I, 414 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 
1969); Gabel v. Hershey, 308 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Va. 1970); Ryan v. Hershey, 308 F. 
Supp. 285 (E.D. Mo. 1969). Contra, Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.I. 
1969); Barker v. Hershey, 309 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Wis. 1969). 
211. Ryan v. Hershey, 308 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Gee v. Smith, 306 F. Supp. 
891 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Grosfeld v. Morris, 303 F. Supp. 227 (D. Md. 1969). Contra, Hunt 
v. Local Bd. No. 197, 423 F.2d 576 (!Id Cir. 1970). 
212. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See notes 72-76 supra and 
accompanying text. 
213. See 113 CONG. R.Ec. 15,426 (1967) (remarks of Senator Russell). 
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nouncement should be within the Oestereich exception to section 
10(b)(3), especially as that exception was set forth in Justice Harlan's 
concurring opinion.214 The Supreme Court has cast some doubt 
upon the validity of this approach by its one-sentence per curiam 
affirmance, citing Gabriel, of the decision of a three-judge district 
court in Boyd v. Clark,215 dismissing a case in which the plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of the student deferment provisions 
of the Act. Boyd, however, need not be read to preclude all constitu-
tional attacks in preinduction actions.216 The lower court held, in 
Boyd, that the plaintiffs' complaint did not present a justiciable con-
troversy because they had not received induction orders. The Su-
preme Court's affirmance might thus be read as barring not all 
constitutional attacks prior to induction, but only those that are 
not yet ripe for adjudication because an induction order has not 
been issued.217 A broader reading of Boyd would be incongruous 
with Oestereich, for it is difficult to believe that board action is 
"basically lawless"-and therefore subject to direct review-when 
in violation of the statute but not when in violation of the Consti-
214. See notes 106-09 supra and accompanying text. 
215. 393 U.S. 316 (1969), affirming 287 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also 
Medeiros v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1968), a case decided prior to 
Oestereich, in which the court found no standing to contest the validity of the Act 
on the ground that the war in Vietnam was not authorized by Congress. 
216. Contra, Steiner v. Commanding Officer, 304 F. Supp. 1157, 1159 (S.D. Tex. 
1969): "the constitutionality of the present Selective Service Act is not justiciable in 
any purported legal controversy prior to induction or refusal thereof [citing Boyd v. 
Clark]." The rule stated by the court is too broad, however, since the registrant in 
Steiner docs not appear to have been ordered for induction. The court's decision thus 
is not inconsistent with the narrow reading of Boyd proposed herein. See also Murray 
v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969), in which the court, although reading Boyd 
to bar constitutional attacks in preinduction cases, enjoined the criminal prosecution 
of a registrant who claimed that expulsion from the Peace Corps for exercising first 
amendment rights had resulted in the loss of his occupational deferment. The court 
acted on the ground that only a court can resolve such a controversy involving different 
governmental branches. See O'Neil, supra note 192. 
217. See Fein v. Local Board No. 7, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3231, 3233 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(Chief Judge Lumbard, dissenting). An attack upon a statute, regulation, or policy that 
has not yet been applied against the plaintiff will not, as a general rule, present a jus-
ticiable case or controversy within the meaning of article III of the Constitution. See 
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-91 (1947); Feldman v. Local Board No. 
22, 239 F. Supp. 102, 105-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Barring exceptional circumstances, there-
fore, a preinduction selective service action filed prior to the receipt of an induction 
order will not be ripe for adjudication. See National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 
1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969). For an analysis of Boyd v. Clark in terms of the related doctrine 
of standing, see Donahue, supra note 8, at 939-40. For a thoughtful discussion of the 
serious problems involved in determining whether actions of the Selective Service 
System prior to the issuance of an order to report for induction can constitute a 
justiciable controversy, see Recent Case, 83 HARv. L. REv. 690, 692-94 (1970). 
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tution.218 With two apparent exceptions,219 the lower federal courts 
have implicitly rejected a broad reading of Boyd. In cases decided 
after Boyd, several courts have adopted a literal interpretation of 
the "classification or processing" language, and have permitted pre-
induction adjudication of challenges to the validity of the delin-
quency regulations,220 the Hershey directive of October 26, 1967,221 
the regulation denying a registrant the right to appeal the refusal 
of his board to reopen his classification,222 and the random-selec-
tion sequence for 1970.223 
A question which is somewhat related to these challenges of 
official policies and procedures of the Selective Service System is 
raised by cases challenging the validity of the composition of a local 
board. This issue has been considered in both preinduction and 
postinduction cases contesting the racial composition224 and the resi-
218. Such a result would clearly run counter to Justice Harlan's construction of 
the "classification or processing" language of § 10(b)(3) in his concurring opinion in 
Oestereich: "I do not understand that phrase to prohibit review of a claim ••• that 
the very statutes or regulations which the Board administers are facially invalid." 393 
U.S. 233, 240 (1968). 
219. In Fein v. Local Bd. No. 7, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3231 (2d Cir. 1970), the court 
held that § IO(b)(3) barred an attack on the constitutionality of 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.1, 
1626.12, &: 1626.24 (1970), which specify the procedures governing an appeal by the state 
director. In Boyk v. Mitchell, 425 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1970), the court held that 
§ 10(b)(3) barred an attack on the constitutionality of the "religious training and belief 
test for conscientious objection contained in 50 U.S.C. App. § 456G) (1964), as amended, 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
220. In Bucher v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 2, 421 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1970) 
(2-1 decision), the court held that the delinquency regulations provided for in 32 C.F.R. 
§§ 1642.1-.46 (1970) violate due process and lack statutory authorization. 
221. See note 78 supra and accompanying text. The court in National Student 
Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969) declared the directive invalid in 
part since it had a chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment rights. 
222. In Hunt v. Local Bd. No. 197, 423 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1970), the court held that 
32 C.F.R. § 1625 (1970) was unauthorized since it denies the registrant the right to 
appeal a local board refusal to reopen although § IO(b)(3) of the statute grants the 
right to appeal local board decisions. 
223. In Stodolsky v. Hershey, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3527 (WJJ. Wis. 1969), the court 
denied a motion to dismiss on grounds that § IO(b)(3) was applicable to a challenge 
of the randomness of the random-selection sequence established by the December I, 
1969, lottery. Another case permitted a preinduction challenge to the requirement of 
Selective Serv. Local Bd. Memorandum No. 64 (Sept. 12, 1968) on the ground that civil-
ian work performed in lieu of induction by registrants classified 1-0 constitutes a disrup-
tion of the registrant's normal way of life comparable to that of a registrant inducted 
into the Armed Forces. Hackney v. Hershey, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3135 (M.D.N.C. 1970). 
The court, without discussing the jurisdictional problem, held on the merits that the 
local board memorandum is authorized by 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1964), as amended, 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
224. E.g., Sellers v. McNamara, 398 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 
950, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 396 U.S. 9 (1969); Clay v. United States, 
397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); DuVemay v. 
United States, 394 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1968), affd. by an equally divided Court, 394 U.S. 
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dential composition225 of the board. Although the Act provides that "in 
the interpretation and execution of the provisions of this title, there 
shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or 
color,"226 members of the Negro race are poorly represented on local 
draft boards throughout the country.227 Registrants claiming racial 
discrimination in the selection of board members have not met 
with success, however. In some of the cases in which the issue was 
raised as a defense to a criminal prosecution for refusal of induction, 
the courts have held that administrative agencies acting under color 
of law are not subject to such collateral attack.228 The few courts 
that have considered the claim on the merits have held that the 
acts of a discriminatorily selected board, like the acts of a malap-
portioned legislature but unlike the acts of an unlawfully selected 
jury, are valid.220 In one case that raised the issue prior to induction, 
the district court's dismissal of the action was affirmed by the Fifth 
309 (1969). See generally Comment, Systematic Exclusion of Negroes from Selective 
Service Boards: Some Proposals for Reform, 67 M1cH. L. REv. 756 (1969); Comment, 
Equality in the Selective Service System: The Racial Composition of Draft Boards, 
54 IOWA L. REV. 521 (1968). 
225. E.g., United States v. Brooks, 415 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 967 (1970); United States v. Beltran, 306 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United 
States v. DeMarco, 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3204 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. Fisher, 
No. IP-69-CR-43 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 20, 1970), appeal pending, No. 18413, 7th Cir., 1970. 
226. 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a) (1964). See also 32 C.F.R. § 1622.l(d) (1970); United 
States v. Wingfield, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3483 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
227. In 1966 there were no Negro members on the local boards of twenty-three 
states. NATL. ADVISORY COMMN. ON SELEcrlVE SERV., IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: "WHO SERVES 
WHEN NoT ALL SERVE? 80 (1967). The situation has generally improved, however. Al-
though in October 1966 only 1.3% of all board members were Negroes, id. at 19, the 
percentage in October 1969 was 6%, SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE &: PROC., SEN. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, A STUDY OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM: !TS OPERATION, 
PRAcrlCES &: PROCEDURES 76, 80 (1970) [hereinafter SUBCOMM. STUDY]. 
228. United States v. Prince, 398 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 967 
(1968); United States v. Richmond, 274 F. Supp. 43 (C.D. Cal. 1967). See DuVernay v. 
United States, 394 F.2d 979, 983 n.6 (5th Cir.), afjd, 394 U.S. 309 (1969). Cf. Ex parte 
Ward, 173 U.S. 452 (1899). Although many of the courts that hold board composition 
is not subject to collateral attack cite Ex parte Ward as authority, the Ward case 
may well have been overruled sub silentio by Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 
(1962). See United States v. Lemke, 310 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1969). 
229. E.g., Haven v. United States, 403 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1968), petition for cert. 
dismissed, 393 U.S. 1114 (1969); Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968), 
vacated and remanded, 394 U.S. 310 (1969). 
For cases upholding the validity of acts by malapportioned legislatures, see Sailors 
v. Board of Educ., 254 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mich. 1966), afjd. on other grounds, 387 
U.S. 105 (1967); Johnson v. Genessee County, 232 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964). For 
cases holding verdicts by unlawfully selected juries to be invalid, see Whitus v. Georgia, 
385 U.S. 545 (1967); Mobley v. United States, 379 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1967); Rabinowitz 
v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966). 
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Circuit,230 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.231 Justice 
Douglas, dissenting in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren 
and Justice Marshall, argued that certiorari should have been 
granted since the allegations of racial discrimination in violation 
of the statute entitled petitioner to review within the Oestereich 
rule.2a2 
Registrants in several cases have claimed that their local board, 
as a result of the residence of its members, was improperly consti-
tuted. The regulations provide that local board members "shall be 
residents of a county in which their local board has jurisdiction 
and ... shall also, if at all practicable, be residents of the area in 
which their local board has jurisdiction."233 The failure of a board 
to meet this requirement has provided registrants with a successful 
defense and has led to their acquittal in some criminal cases,234 but 
most of the courts have held that such a de facto board is not sub-
ject to collateral attack in a criminal prosecution,235 or on a petition 
230. Sellers v. McNamara, 398 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968). Accord, Gee v. Smith, 306 
F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ga. 1969). 
231. 395 U.S. 950 (1969). 
232. 395 U.S. at 953. 
233. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.52(c) (1970). The jurisdictional-area residency requirement was 
recently deleted from the regulations. Exec. Order No. 11,555 35 Fed. Reg. 14,191 (1970). 
See also Registration Certificate, SSS Form No. 2 (April 20, 1967), which informs 
the registrant that "your local board is composed of citizens of the community 
in which you live." Selective Service System forms are part of the regulations, 
32 C.F.R. § 1606.5l(a) (1970), and are therefore binding on the System. The 
importance to the selective service process of the concept of a local board as 
a little group of neighbors has long been recognized. See United States v. Nugent, 
346 U.S. 1, 8 (1953); Knox v. United States, 200 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1952): 
J. DAVIS&: K. DOLBEARE, LrITLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 
v, 57 (1968) (quoting the remarks of Lt. Gen. Hershey); SELECTIVE SERV. SYs., OUTLINE 
OF HisrORICAL BACKGROUND OF SELECTIVE SERVICE AND CHRONOLOGY 5-6 (1965); MEMO• 
RANDUM OF LT. GEN. HERSHEY, ON PRESENT OPERATIONS OF THE SYsrEM AND LOCAL 
DRAFI' BOARDS, S. Doc. No. 82, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966). 
32 C.F.R. § 1604.52 (1970) was apparently promulgated in response to Congress' 
adverse reaction to a proposal that the role of local boards in the selective service 
process be de-emphasized. See H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1967): 
S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1967). See also TASK FORCE ON THE STRUC· 
TURE OF THE SELECTIVE SERV. SYs., REPORT VI-22, X-2 (1967). Notwithstanding the 
requirement of the regulation, a recent study revealed that at least 8%, and perhaps 
as many as 25%, of the members of local boards reside outside the area of their 
board's jurisdiction. SuncoMM. STUDY, supra note 227, at 5, 74. 
234. United States v. Cabbage, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3179 (6th Cir. 1970); United States 
v. Brock, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3125 (N.D. Cal. 1970): United States v. Beltran, 306 F. Supp, 
385 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. Machado, 306 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1969); 
United States v. Jones, 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3392 (C.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. 
DeMarco, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3204 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. Lemke, 310 F. 
Supp. 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1969). See United States v. Hinch, 292 F. Supp. 696, 698 (W.D. 
Mo. 1968) (dictum). 
235. United States v. Chaudron, 425 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. 
Brooks, 415 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1969); Jessen v. United States, 242 F.2d 213 (10th Cir. 
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for habeas corpus.236 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed 
the dismissal of a preinduction case presenting a direct attack to 
the residential composition of a local board.237 
The denial of preinduction review of the composition of a local 
board might seem appropriate in cases in which the facts are in 
dispute. In such cases, the court would have to hear evidence and 
make findings of fact, an exercise which could result in the delay 
in the selection process which Congress sought to prevent by en-
acting section IO(b)(3). When the facts are uncontested, however, 
the rule that local board action in violation of the statute or the 
regulations will entitle the registrant to judicial relief prior to in-
duction should permit such relief in preinduction actions chal-
lenging the composition of the local board.238 The holdings of 
several courts that such an attack may not be made collaterally, but 
may only be raised by a direct attack, gives added weight to the 
argument that section IO(b)(3) should not be read to bar such cases 
prior to induction.239 Indeed, since it may be that the only way to 
raise the issue would be in a preinduction action,240 an interpretation 
of section IO(b)(3) which bars such an action may raise serious 
constitutional problems.241 
1957); United States v. Fisher, No. IP-69-CR-43 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 20, 1970), appeal pend-
ing, No. 18413, 7th Cir. 1970; United States v. Nussbaum, 306 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 
1969); United States v. Kaul, 305 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1969). 
236. United States ex rel. Johnson v. McBee, 3ll F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
237. Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 
38 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. June 10, 1970). Accord, Ryan v. Hershey, 308 F. Supp. 285 
(E.D. Mo. 1969). In Steiner v. Officer in Command, 304 F. Supp. 1157, ll62 (S.D. Tex. 
1969), the court held that the issue could not be considered prior to induction, but 
based its decision on the ground that the rule in the Fifth Circuit under Clay v. 
United States, 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968), precluded such attacks even after 
induction. 
238. The Seventh Circuit apparently did not believe that the issue was barred by 
§ 10(b)(3), since in its opinion in Czepil v. Hershey, the court considered the regis-
trant's claim on its merits, reviewed the decision of the district court, and did not 
affirm the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. 425 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1970). 
239. See Sellers v. McNamara, 398 F.2d 893, 895 (5th Cir. 1968) (separate opinion 
of Judge Tuttle), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 950 (1969). 
240. Several cases have suggested that the composition of a local board may be 
attacked by proceedings in the nature of quo warranto brought against the allegedly 
disqualified board members to oust them from office. Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 
251 (7th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. June 10, 1970); 
United States v. Nussbaum, 306 F. Supp. 66 (W .D. Cal. 1969). However, since a 
private individual lacks standing to institute such a proceeding and a United States 
Attorney may decline to bring such an action, the quo warranto remedy is inadequate. 
United States v. Lemke, 310 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1969). See United States v. 
Machado, 306 F. Supp. 995, 1000-02 (N.D. Cal. 1969). 
241. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local 13d. No. II, 393 U.S. 233, 243 
(1968) Oustice Harlan, concurring); United States v. Machado, 306 F. Supp. 995, 
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F. The Constitutionality of Section lO(b )(3) 
The power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts is considerable. Article III of the Constitution subjects the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to such exceptions and 
regulations as Congress shall make,242 and vests Congress with the 
power to provide for and establish the inferior federal courts.243 
Although these provisions have been treated as giving Congress 
plenary control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts,244 it has 
been recognized that the power of Congress to regulate the juris-
diction of the courts is limited by the requirements of due process 
of law245 and by the principle of the supremacy of law.246 Thus, 
Congress could not eliminate all judicial review of the actions of 
the Selective Service System.247 Section IO(b)(3) does not, however, 
eliminate judicial review altogether; it merely postpones the tim-
ing of such review. 
The provision's restriction of review until after induction was 
found constitutionally unobjectionable by the Supreme Court in 
Clark v. Gabriel.248 Although the Court upheld the statute, it did 
1001 (N.D. CaL 1969). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 
(1803): "The very essence of a civil liberty ceretainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. 
One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection." 
242. "In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have 
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
243. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Con-
gress shall have Power ••• To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court." 
244. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. 
Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Ex parte Mccardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
245. See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 127 (1946) Gustice Murphy, 
concurring); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Battaglia v. General Motors 
Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). See generally C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (1963); Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953). 
246. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) Gustice 
Brandeis, concurring). 
247. See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 125-32 (1946) Gustice Murphy, 
concurring). 
248. 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (per curiam). In Gabriel, the Court summarily reversed 
the decision of a district court which had invalidated § IO(b)(3) on due process 
grounds. 287 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Cal. 1968). The court below had agreed with the 
conclusion of the district court in Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 711 (N.D. 
Cal. 1968), revd., 411 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), that the statute would 
offend due process since "judicial review cannot be conditioned on the risk of in-
curring a substantial penalty or complying with an invalid order." 287 F. Supp. at 371. 
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not consider the question whether section 10(b)(3) could consti-
tutionally bar preinduction review of a claim involving the violation 
of constitutional rights. The substantial risks of seeking review in 
a criminal prosecution249 and the hardships of submitting to induc-
tion and petitioning for habeas corpus250 may require the avail-
ability of a method of contesting alleged unconstitutional board 
action prior to induction,251 particularly when first amendment 
rights are involved.252 Ironically, it may well be unconstitutional to 
apply section IO(b)(3) to a case like the one it was intended to over-
rule-one involving the chilling effect on first amendment activity 
found in Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board Number 16.253 
Ill. OTHER JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS 
A. Federal-Question Jurisdiction 
Most preinduction actions have alleged the presence of federal-
question jurisdiction under section 1331 of the Judicial Code.254 In 
249. See note 12 supra. 
250. See note 13 supra. 
251. See Leonard & Frantz, Judidal Review of Selective Service Orders, 26 THE 
GUILD PRACTITIONER 85, 95-97 (1967). 
252. Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038, 1058 (D.R.I. 1969). See Monaghan, 
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518, 550-51 (1970); Comment, 
Juricial Review of Selective Service Action: A Need for Reform, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 
448, 458 (1968); Recent Case, 81 HARV. L. REv. 685, 690 (1968). But see Note, The Chill-
ing Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 808, 831 (1969). 
253. 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967). See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text. 
Although the Wolff case, which involved the punitive reclassification of two students, 
was decided at a time when the undergraduate-student deferment was discretionary, 
it has since been made mandatory by the 1967 Act. See notes 162-63 supra and accompany-
ing text. Thus if Wolff occurred today, the registrants would be able to secure pre-
induction relief on the authority of Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 
U.S. 460 (1970). See notes 126-27, 166-74 supra and accompanying text. The Wolff 
situation may arise, however, in a setting in which early review would be 
unavailable under the Supreme Court's construction of § I0(b)(3). For example, 
should a local board remove a teacher's discretionary occupational deferment, 
see note 178 supra, for signing a petition in support of draft refusers, this 
would not be a proper case for early review under Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 
256 (1968). Yet, such board action would result in the chilling effect on first amend-
ment rights found present in Wolff. It is believed that the application of § IO{b)(3) 
to bar relief in such a case would be unconstitutional. Several courts have indicated 
that this constitutional aspect of Wolff could not be overruled by Congress. See, e.g., 
National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d ll03, ll08 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Zig-
mond v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 284 F. Supp. 732, 735 n.4 (D. Mass.), stay 
of induction denied, 396 F.2d 290 (1st Cir.), application for stay denied, 391 U.S. 930 
(1968). 
254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). Since the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, 
and since they possess only the jurisdiction that Congress has conferred upon them by 
statute, Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922), a plaintiff must present a 
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order to meet the requirements of section 1331, the action must 
arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States255 
and involve an amount in controversy in excess of 10,000 dollars.256 
Since a selective service action invariably involves a dispute or con-
troversy with respect to the validity, construction, or effect of the 
Military Selective Service Act, the requirement that the claim arise 
under federal law is clearly met.257 Whether the jurisdictional-
amount requirement is also met raises a more difficult question. 
claim that fits within some congressional grant of authority in order to be entitled 
to bring his action in federal court. Lock.erty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); 
Feldman v. Local Bd. No. 22, 239 F. Supp. 102, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). A litigant 
seeking judicial review of the actions of a federal administrative agency will usually 
have little difficulty bringing his action in federal court since most regulatory statutes 
explicitly authorize such review (see Developments in the Law-Remedies Against 
the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARv. L. REV. 827, 903-04 (1957)), or review is 
available under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964), as 
amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). A registrant challenging the actions of 
the Selective Service System, however, will be unable to base his action on such a statu• 
tory provision (see 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1965-1968)), 
and will have to seek what has been termed "nonstatutory" judicial review. See Byse &: 
Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judi-
cial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308, 321-22 (1967). Such 
nonstatutory review is often based upon the general- federal-question jurisdiction of 
the district courts. Federal-question jurisdiction, provided for in U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 2, is vested in the federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a) (1964): "The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the amount in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and 
arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." A plaintiff who 
files a preinduction selective service action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief must 
rely on § 1331 or some other jurisdictional grant, since the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964), does not accord the district court a separate jurisdictional 
basis on which it can act. Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 406 F.2d 636, 637 
(2d Cir. 1968), revd. on other grounds, 396 U.S. 460 (1970). 
255. 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a} (1964). See note 254 supra. See generally C. WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL COURTS §§ 16-22 (1963), 
256. 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a} (1964). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 32-37 
(1963). For a discussion of the jurisdictional-amount requirement as it relates to selec-
tive service actions, see generally Note, Draft Reclassifications for Political Demon-
strations-Jurisdictional Amount in Suits Against Federal Officers, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 
916 (1968). 
257. This "arising under" requirement has generally received a liberal interpreta• 
tion by the federal courts. See, e.g., Empresa Hondurena De Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 
300 F.2d 222, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1962), vacated on other grounds sub nom. McCulloch v. 
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. IO (1963). Although the courts 
in many selective service cases have been troubled by the jurisdictional-amount re• 
quirement, they have not considered the arising-under requirement as presenting any 
problems. E.g., Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 
1967): Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969); Armendariz v. Hershey, 
295 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 413 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1969); Breen 
v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 284 F. Supp. 749 (D. Conn.), afjd., 406 F.2d 636 
(2d Cir. 1968), revd. on other grounds, 396 U.S. 460 (1970). Although the district court 
in Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 280 F. Supp. 78 (D. Wyo.), 
affd., 390 F.2d 100 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), revd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968), found that 
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The jurisdictional-amount provision of section 1331 has gen-
erally been interpreted to require a controversy involving money or 
some right the value of which can be ascertained in money.258 In 
some cases, a plaintiff2159 in a preinduction selective service action 
challenging the validity of an induction order will be able to dem-
onstrate that induction will result in a pecuniary loss to him in excess 
of 10,000 dollars. A plaintiff claiming entitlement to a deferment or 
exemption, and whose yearly income exceeds military pay by at least 
5,000 dollars,260 or who can prove that he would be able to secure 
employment at such a salary,261 should encounter little difficulty in 
demonstrating a loss of anticipated income equal to 10,000 dollars. 
An unemployed registrant claiming a student deferment may be 
able to demonstrate that interruption of his education at a crucial 
point will result in a pecuniary loss in excess of 10,000 dollars.262 
Moreover, since induction into the Armed Forces for two years pre-
sumably decreases by two the civilian income-producing years avail-
able in a lifetime, a registrant may be able to meet the jurisdictional 
neither of the jurisdictional requirements had been met, the Government assumed 
that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964), subject to proof 
that the jurisdictional-amount requirement was met, and urged the Supreme Court 
to remand the case so that a hearing could be held on that issue. Brief for Respondents 
at 66, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968); 
Memorandum for Respondents at 13, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 
393 U.S. 233 (1968), The Court eventually adopted such a course. 393 U.S. at 239. 
258. E.g., Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847). 
259. The Supreme Court has recently held that plaintiffs in class actions under 
Fm. R. C1v. P. 23 cannot aggregate the amounts of their claims to reach the $10,000 
jurisdictional amount. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). However, under the 
traditional rule-which was left intact by the Court-claims of different individuals 
may be aggregated to meet the requirement when those individuals share a common 
and undivided interest. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 36, at 102 (1963). It may be 
argued that this rule is met in a selective service case involving an occupational 
deferment in which the registrant's employer is permissively joined under Fm. R. 
CIV. P. 20, or in a case involving a dependency deferment in which the registrant's 
dependents are coparties. 
260. Such an approach was utilized in Rheingans v. Clark, I SEL. SERV. L. REP. 
3380 (N.D. Cal. 1968), in which the court held that the jurisdictional-amount require-
ment was satisfied since plaintiff's current salary for the two-year period would exceed 
by at least $10,000 the salary he would earn in the civilian work to which he was 
ordered to report as a conscientious objector. See also Stone v. Christensen, 36 F. 
Supp. 739 (D. Ore. 1940). 
261. See Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.!. 1969). 
262. See Walsh v. Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (taking 
judicial notice of the pecuniary rewards of a college education); Armendariz v. 
Hershey, 295 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 413 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 
1969) (student's right to I-S deferment to complete academic year assumed to exceed 
$10,000). Cf. Connelly v. University of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965) 
(value of right to complete fourth year of medical school held to exceed $10,000 in 
student's action for reinstatement). 
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amount requirement by making an actuarial calculation of the 
reduction in lifetime anticipated income discounted to present 
capitalized value.263 
Many registrants, however, will have difficulty establishing pe-
cuniary loss. They may be able to argue that deprivation of a con-
stitutional or statutory right results in an injury in excess of the 
jurisdictional amount. Although some nonpecuniary rights have 
been held capable of pecuniary calculation for purposes of meeting 
the jurisdictional amount,264 the courts have generally held that 
federal-question jurisdiction is unavailable unless a monetary value 
can be ascribed to the deprivation of the rights at issue.265 A plaintiff 
thus must attempt to express the right in controversy in monetary 
terms; an allegation that the right is priceless will not suffice.266 It 
is especially unwise for counsel to concede that no monetary loss is 
involved. Such a concession was held fatal in a preinduction selec-
tive service action challenging the constitutionality of the student 
deferment provisions of the statute.267 Although it appears anoma-
lous to suggest that constitutional or statutory rights are worth less 
than property rights,268 prudent counsel should be prepared to dem-
263. This novel approach is suggested in SEL. SERV. L. REP. PRACTICE MANUAL 
1f 3526 (1969). See Fein v. Local Bd. No. 7, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3231, 3233 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(Chief Judge Lumbard, dissenting). 
264. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485 (1903); Berk v. Laird, No. 35007 (2d Cir. 
June 19, 1970); Howard v. Ladner, ll6 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Miss. 1953), revd. sub nom. 
White v. Howard, 347 U.S. 910 (1954). 
265. Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847) (custody of a child); Giancana 
v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965) (invasion 
of privacy in violation of fourth and fifth amendments); Carroll v. Somervell, ll6 
F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1941) (federal employee's loss of standing in community due to 
dismissal for failure to sign noncommunist affidavit); Ackerman v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (denial of right to equal broadcasting 
time in violation of first, fifth, ninth, tenth and fifteenth amendments). 
266. Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 120 (1847) (The right to custody 
of a child "is evidently utterly incapable of being reduced to any pecuniary standard 
of value, as it rises superior to money considerations."); Giancana v. Johnson, 335 
F.2d 366, 368 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965). ("If, as plaintiff 
contends, the sum or value cannot be alleged because of the priceless rights involved, 
how can this court infer that essential element?"). 
267. Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd., 393 U.S. 316 (per 
curiam) (without reaching jurisdictional question). Accord, Guffanti v. Hershey, 296 
F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
268. The court could easily assume that freedom from an unconstitutional dis-
crimination exceeds the sum or value of $10,000.00. This is not the nineteenth 
century where property rights were valued over human rights. If a man can sue 
in federal court on the allegation that the government is injuring his property, 
he certainly must be allowed to sue on the allegation that the government is op-
pressing him personally. Although it might be said that human rights are incap-
able of valuation and hence valueless, it is better to view them as incapable of 
valuation but only because they are of infinite value. The latter view is, in my 
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onstrate that the deprivation of such rights results in pecuniary loss. 
In cases involving constitutional rights, this has been accomplished 
by employing arguments based on the economic harm that results 
from the deprivation of such rights and by analogy to tort-like dam-
ages.269 Damages for pain and suffering, for defamation, and for 
invasion of privacy are often highly speculative; and if cases in-
volving such damage routinely meet the jurisdictional-amount re-
quirement, intangible damage resulting from a violation of consti-
tutional or statutory rights should likewise meet that requirement. 
Although the claim must be capable of valuation in money, this fact 
should not require plaintiffs to show an economic loss with absolute 
certainty, especially in view of the rule that a complaint is not to be 
dismissed for failure to meet the jurisdictional-amount requirement 
unless it appears "to a legal certainty that the claim is really for 
less than the jurisdictional amount."270 
Although a registrant might thus convince a court that the in-
fringement of his rights has a monetary value in excess of 10,000 
dollars, many registrants will no doubt be unable to do this. In 
such a case, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that his claim 
fits within another section of the Judicial Code,271 the court must 
grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
and may even be under a duty to dismiss sua sponte.272 Although 
humble opinion, the only view compatible with the commitment of our nation 
to a belief in the dignity of men and the inherent worth of a free individual in 
a free society. 
Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) Uudge Edelstein, dissenting). 
269. See Note, Draft Reclassifications for Political Demonstrations-Jurisdictional 
Amount in Suits Against Federal Officers, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 916, 922-24 (1968). 
270. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). Accord, 
Fein v. Local Bd. No. 7, 3 SEL. SERV. L REP. 3231, 3233 (2d Cir. 1970) (Chief Judge 
Lumbard, dissenting); Berk v. Laird, No. 35007 (2d Cir. June 19, 1970); Parker v. Erie-
Lackawanna Sys., 393 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1968); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 
(D.R.!. 1969). But see Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 280 F. Supp. 
78, 80 (D. Wyo.) (finding no jurisdictional amount where complaint was concerned 
with "intellectual freedom rather than economic loss'), afjd. 390 F.2d 100 (10th Cir.) 
(per curiam), revd. on other grounds, 393 U.S. 233 (1968) (remanded to enable plain-
tiff to demonstrate that he meets the jurisdictional-amount requirement). See Memo-
randum for Respondents at 13 n.5, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 
393 U.S. 233 (1968). 
271. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964) (mandamus jurisdiction). See notes 287-99 infra 
and accompanying text. 
272. Although several courts in selective service cases have accepted uncontested 
allegations that the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, apparently on the theory 
that allegations not denied are deemed established-e.g., Rich v. Hershey, 408 F.2d 
944 (10th Cir. 1969); Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 406 F.2d 636, 637 n.l 
(2d Cir. 1968); Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) Uudge Edelstein, 
dissenting)-this procedure is of questionable validity. See McNutt v. General Motors 
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a requirement that a dollar value be specifically averred in cases 
in which substantial constitutional or statutory rights are involved 
may appear to exalt form over substance,273 Congress expressly 
made the. jurisdictional amount a necessary element of federal-
question jurisdiction. Unless the requirement is unconstitutional, 
the federal courts must defer to that legislative determination.274 
Some courts have recently indicated a willingness to question 
the constitutionality of the jurisdictional-amount requirement. In 
Murray v. Vaughn,215 the court, in denying the Government's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, suggested that the jurisdic-
tional-amount requirement might be unconstitutional if read to 
prevent a federal district court from reaching the merits of a claim 
that alleged the infringement of constitutional rights. Since the 
court thought that such a reading of section 1331 might deprive 
a plaintiff alleging injury to constitutional rights access to any 
federal forum, it concluded that the jurisdictional-amount pro-
vision might violate both the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment and article III, section 2 of the Constitution.276 The provision 
would be even more constitutionally suspect if so applied in a first 
amendment context,277 particularly if a chilling effect on the exercise 
of first amendment rights was at stake. If the chilling-effect doctrine 
can be used to overcome the constitutional requirement of a case 
or controversy,218 then -it certainly can -be used to overcome the 
statutory requirement of jurisdictional amount. In order to avoid 
such constitutional problems, section 1331 should be liberally con-
strued in cases alleging the infringement of constitutional rights. 
The jurisdictional-amount requirement has come under increas-
ing criticism in recent years, especially in its application to cases 
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936); Mansfield, Coldwater 8e Lake Mich. Ry. v. 
Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884); FED. R. C1v. P. 12(h){2). In Ackerman v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 628, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court found itself 
"under a duty to raise the issue of the absence of the required jurisdictional amount 
even if the parties to the litigation have not." 
273. See Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1964) Uudge Swygert, 
dissenting). 
274. Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1967). See 
note 254 supra. 
275. 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969). 
276. 300 F. Supp. at 695. See also Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) (Iudge Edelstein, dissenting). 
277. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. R.Ev. 518, 550-51 
(1970). 
278: National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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involving claims against federal officers.279 Two rationales have 
been given in support of the requirement, neither of which applies 
to cases brought against the federal government alleging depriva-
tion of federal constitutional or statutory rights. One rationale 
is grounded on notions of federalism and deference to state courts,280 
and these considerations have no place in actions against the Selec-
tive Service System. The other rationale is based on the desire to 
keep petty controversies out of the federal courts,281 and no one 
would suggest that an alleged deprivation of federal rights is petty 
or insubstantial.282 Indeed, it is questionable whether Congress 
itself intended the jurisdictional-amount requirement to apply to 
cases against federal officers.283 Commentators have urged that the 
requirement be abrogated for cases that meet the requirement that 
the controversy arise under federal law,284 and the American Law 
Institute has proposed a substitute for section 1331 which contains 
no jurisdictional-amount requirement.285 Although there are no 
279. See Note, Draft Reclassification for Political Demonstrations-Jurisdictional 
Amount in Suits Against Federal Officers, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 916 (1968). 
280. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1934): 
From the beginning suits between citizens of different states, or involving federal 
questions, could neither be brought in the federal courts nor removed to them, 
unless the value of the matter in controversy was more than a specified amount. 
Cases involving lesser amounts have been left to be dealt with exclusively by state 
courts, except that judgment of the highest court of a state adjudicating a federal 
right may be reviewed by this Court. 
281. The purpose for raising the jurisdictional amount to $10,000 in 1958 was ex-
plained in the Senate report accompanying the bill: 
The recommendations of the Judicial Conference regarding the amount in 
controversy, which this committee approves, is based on the premise that the 
amount should be fixed at a sum of money that will make jurisdiction available 
in all substantial controversies where other elements of Federal jurisdiction are 
present. The jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to convert the Federal 
courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter .away their ·time in the 
trial of petty controversies. 
S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958). 
282. Walsh v. Local Bel. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
283. Congress has provided in separate statutes for judicial review without regard 
to jurisdictional amount in so many types of federal-question cases (C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
COURTS § 32, at 91 (1963)) that the committee reports accompanying the 1958 amend-
ment state that "the only significant categories of 'Federal question' cases subject to 
the jurisdictional amount are suits under the Jones Act and suits contesting the 
constitutionality of State statutes." S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958). 
284. See Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REv. 
213, 216-18 (1959); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial 
Code, 13 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 225-26 (1948). 
285. The proposed § 133l(a) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have. 
original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of all civil actions, 
including those for a declaratory judgment, in which the initial pleading sets forth 
a substantial claim arising under the constitution, laws or treaties of the United 
States, 
ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIGrlON BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 24 
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current proposals before Congress to amend the section, it is pos-
sible that the attention focused on the problem by recent selective 
service cases will cause Congress to consider plugging this "unfor-
tunate gap in the statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts."286 
B. Mandamus Jurisdiction 
Since a registrant must demonstrate that his local board violated 
its statutory mandate in order to bring his case within the Oestereich 
exception to section IO(b)(3), a plaintiff seeking preinduction re-
view should be able to establish the presence of mandamus juris-
diction under section 1361 of the Judicial Code.287 Section 1361 vests 
the federal district courts with "original jurisdiction of any action in 
the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the 
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the 
plaintiff."288 The purpose of this provision, enacted in 1962, was to 
enable litigants, who previously had been restricted to the courts of 
the District of Columbia, to bring actions in federal district courts 
throughout the country seeking to review and compel official ac-
tion.289 The phrase "in the nature of mandamus" was added to make 
clear that the jurisdiction conferred by section 1361 "is limited to 
compelling a Government official or agency to perform a duty owed 
to the plaintiff or to make a decision, but not to direct or influence 
the exercise of discretion of the officer in the making of the deci-
sion."290 It has been recognized, however, that mandamus is available 
to provide relief against administrative action which, even though 
within the authority granted, has gone beyond any rational exercise 
of discretion. 291 
(Official Draft 1969). Also relevant are the ALI comments concerning the proposed 
§ 1331. Id. at 172-76. 
286. Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1967). 
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964). See generally Byse&: Fiocca, Section 1J6I of the Manda-
mus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administra-
tive Action, 81 HARv. L. REv. 308 (1967). 
288. 28 u.s.c. § 1361 (1964). 
289. Smith v. United States, 333 F.2d 70 (10th Cir. 1964); Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 
287, at 318-19. The statute also added liberal venue and service-of-process provisions. 
28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1964). See notes 300-11 infra and accompanying text. 
290. S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1962). See Guffanti v. Hershey, 296 
F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), in which the court held that mandamus was unavail-
able to compel the Director of Selective Service to rescind a local board memorandum 
and to issue a new one. 
291. United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F .2d 371 (2d Cir. 
1968). See Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 287, at 333-35. Although some courts have per-
sisted in carrying over the ministerial-discretionary distinction of common-law man-
damus, e.g., Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966), this tendency has been severely criticized, 
See Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 287, at 349-51. 
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A litigant relying on section 1361 in a preinduction selective 
service action would have to demonstrate that the defendant local 
board had failed to perform a duty imposed by the Constitution,292 
the statute,293 the selective service regulations,294 or a treaty of the 
United States.295 The duty owed the plaintiff must be clear, but the 
fact that the duty becomes clear only after administrative or judicial 
construction of the provision involved does not preclude mandamus 
relief.296 The remedy of mandamus is equitable in nature, and a 
court may decline to exercise its discretion to issue mandamus relief 
when other adequate remedies are available.297 A court should not 
decline to exercise its jurisdiction on this ground, however, since 
the only alternatives to a preinduction action would be criminal 
prosecution for refusal of induction or habeas corpus proceedings 
following induction. 
The "arising under" and the "amount in controversy" require-
ments for federal-question jurisdiction under section 1331 do not 
apply to mandamus jurisdiction based on section 1361.298 Moreover, 
once section 1361 jurisdiction is established, it provides an indepen-
dent basis for jurisdiction to grant injunctive or declaratory relief.299 
IV. VENUE 
Included in the 1962 amendments to the Judicial Code was a 
liberal provision for venue and service of process in actions against 
federal officers or agencies sued in their official capacity.800 Before 
this provision was added, an action against a subordinate govern-
ment official who resided in the judicial district where suit was filed 
292. E.g., Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 697 (D.R.I. 1969). 
293. E.g., Hardenbergh v. Selective Serv. Sys., 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3315 (D. Minn. 
1969); Armendariz v. Hershey, 295 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex. 1969). 
294. E.g., Turley v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 134, 301 F. Supp. 845 (C.D. 
Cal. 1969); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 707 (D.RJ. 1969). 
295. See Itzcovitz v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 6, 301 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), ap-
peal dismissed, 3 SEL. SERV, L. REP. 3063 (2d Cir. 1970). 
296. Carey v. Local Bd. No. 2, 297 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn.), affd., 412 F.2d 71 (2d 
Cir. 1969). 
297. Carter v. Seamans, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3082 (S.D. Tex. 1968), affd., 411 F.2d 
767 (5th Cir. 1969). 
298. Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judidal Review: Sovereign 
Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1479, 1516-17 (1962). 
See Knutson v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 36, 304 F. Supp. 730 (D. Minn. 1969). 
299. See Weppler v. Hershey, 308 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Medoff v. Freeman, 
246 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1965), affd., 263 F. 2d 472 (1st Cir. 1966). A contrary im-
plication in Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364 (10th 
Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966), has been criticized as "clearly in-
correct." Byse&: Fiocca, supra note 287, at 350-51. 
300. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e} (1964). 
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was often dismissed because the doctrine of indispensable parties re-
quired joinder of the officer's superior over whom the district court 
lacked venue and process.301 Congress eliminated this problem not 
by changing the indispensable-superior doctrine, but by adding sec-
tion 139l(e), which allows the plaintiff to join the superior in an 
action brought locally against the subordinate.302 
Since all of the defendants in a selective service action will be 
federal officers, employees, or agencies, venue may now be laid in a 
federal district where any of the defendants reside.303 Under section 
139l(e), personal service may be made upon such a defendant,304 
with service by certified mail made upon the nonresident defen-
dants.305 
Some plaintiffs in selective service cases have had their inductions 
transferred to local boards where they were temporarily residing,306 
and have attempted to gain the advantages of section 139l(e) by 
naming the transferee board as a defendant. Although this approach 
has worked in several cases,307 a few courts have ruled that the 
301. E.g., Sorenson v. Selective Serv. Sys., 203 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See Byse, 
supra note 298, at 1493-99. 
302. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1964) provides: 
(e) A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United 
States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal 
authority, or an agency of the United States, may, except as otherwise provided 
by law, be brought in any judicial district in which: (1) a defendant in the action 
resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the 
action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the 
action. 
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures except that the delivery of the summons and 
complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by cer-
tified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is 
brought. 
303. Although § 1391(e) does not apply in cases in which any of the defendants is 
not a federal official or agency, the court in such a case may sever the nonfederal de• 
fendant and retain the case. Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 
507, 511-12 (D. Conn. 1968). 
304. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(5). 
305. Although § 139l(e) is a venue provision, it extends the extraterritorial juris-
diction of the district courts as well. Metz v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa. 
1969); Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs. v. Denver&: Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., 290 F. 
Supp. 612, 615-16 (D. Colo. 1968), afjd., 411 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1969); Powelton Civic 
Home Owners Assn. v. Department of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 832-34 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
306. Such transfers for induction are provided for in 32 C.F.R. § 1632.9 (1970). 
307. Barker v. Hershey, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3134 (W.D. Wis. 1970). In most of the 
cases in which this approach has been successful, venue was not questioned. E.g., Foley 
v. Hershey, 409 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Rich v. Hershey, 303 F. Supp. 
177 (D. Colo.), afjd., 408 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1969). The plaintiff in Foley, a registrant 
with a Massachusetts local board, had his induction transferred to an Indiana local 
board in the area of the university he was attending. He then filed suit in the district 
court in Indiana, naming as defendants the local boards and state directors of both 
states and the National Director. Foley v. Hershey, No. IP-69-C-77 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 20, 
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joinder of such a nominal defendant is insufficient to meet the re-
quirements of section 139l(e).308 Venue clearly can be laid in the 
federal district where a plaintiff's local board is located, however, 
on the ground either that the board members reside there or that 
the cause of action arose there. Moreover, when the action chal-
lenges the validity of a Selective Service pronouncement issued by 
the National Director, the suit may be filed in the Federal District 
Court for the District of Columbia.309 Since no real property would 
be involved in a selective service suit, the action may be brought, 
pursuant to section 139l(e)(4), in the district where plaintiff re-
sides.810 Residence for purposes of venue is the equivalent of domi-
cile,311 and a transitory or temporary place of abode will not, there-
fore, meet the requirements of section 139l(e).312 
V. FORMS OF RELIEF 
A. Injunctive Relief 
The principal reason for challenging Selective Service action 
prior to induction is the avoidance of the "Robson's choice"313 of 
either complying with the allegedly illegal order and accepting in-
duction or disobeying that order and facing a criminal charge. 
Since a selective service case will not ordinarily be ripe for adjudi-
cation until an induction order has been issued,314 a registrant chal-
lenging a board classification decision or procedure will be unable 
to file suit until he has been ordered to report for induction. How-
1969). The venue issue was not considered by the court, however. See Robinson v. 
Hershey, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3191 (7th Cir. 1969). Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, 
venue is merely a personal privilege which may be waived if timely objection is not 
raised. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (1964); Fm. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 12(h). 
308. Robinson v. Hershey, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3191 (S.D. Ind. 1969), injunction 
pending appeal denied, 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3191 (7th Cir. 1969) (expressing no opinion 
on the venue question); Nelson v. Local Bd. No. 1, 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3192 (D. Conn. 
1969). 
309. Fine v. McGuire, 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3687 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Nestor v. Hershey, 
425 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
310. See note 302 supra. 
llll. "Domicile" consists of physical presence plus the intent to remain indefinitely. 
E.g., New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lauffer, 215 F. Supp. 91, 97 (S.D. Cal. 1963); 
Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin, 191 F. Supp. 245, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
ll12. Robinson v. Hershey, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3190 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (school resi• 
dence); Nelson v. Local Bd. No. 1, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3192 (D. Conn. 1969) (school 
residence). See King v. Wall &: Beaver St. Corp., 145 F.2d ll77 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Cham-
pion Spark Plug Co. v. Karchmar, 180 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
313. See United States v. Stewart, 306 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1969), appeal dismissed, 
396 U.S. 1066 (1970). 
314. See note 217 supra. 
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ever, the time between the issuance of such an order and the date 
of induction is usually no more than a few weeks.315 Therefore, in 
order to prevent a case from being mooted by the plaintiff's induc-
tion, 316 provisional relief in the form of a temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction of plaintiff's induction will be 
necessary. 317 
Injunctions are issued within the discretion of the court in cases 
in which plaintiff can establish that such relief is necessary to pre-
vent immediate and irreparable injury, that he has a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits, that he has exhausted his ad-
ministrative remedies, and that the equities between the parties 
balance in his favor.318 A plaintiff in a preinduction selective service 
action should have little difficulty meeting these requirements. An 
unsuccessful personal appearance and appeal will meet the exhaus-
tion requirement.319 Irreparable harm has been found when plain-
tiff's induction is imminent, since unless enjoined, the induction 
will render the case moot.320 Moreover, there is no countervailing 
interest in inducting a registrant on one particular day rather than 
315. Although an Order to Report for Induction, SSS Form No. 252 (April 28, 
1965) (the form is reproduced in A. TATUM 8: J. TUCHINSKY, supra note I, at 80-81), 
must be mailed at least ten days before the date of induction, 32 C.F.R. § 1632.1 
(1970), the registrant is rarely given more than a few weeks. He may be able to gain 
extra time by seeking a postponement of induction for emergencies beyond his con-
trol, 32 C.F.R. § 1632.2 (1970), or a transfer of his induction to a local board in the 
area in which he is currently located, 32 C.F.R. § 1632.9 (1970). 
316. E.g., Martel v. Hershey, 2 SEL. SERV, L. REP. 3110 (S.D. Ind. 1969), 
317. If sufficient time is available, the plaintiff should seek a preliminary injunc-
tion, a motion for which is heard on notice and with opportunity for the defendant 
to be heard. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(l). The court may order the trial of the action on 
the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application for 
a preliminary injunction. FED. R. CIV, P. 65(a)(2). A temporary restraining order may 
be issued ex parte if it is shown by affidavit or verified complaint that immediate 
and irreparable harm will result before a hearing for a preliminary injunction can 
be held, and the efforts to provide notice to defendant have been set forth. FED. R. 
CIV, P. 65(b). If possible, the plaintiff should attempt to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion rather than a temporary restraining order, since orders denying or dissolving a 
preliminary injunction are appealable, C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at 400-01 
(1963), while orders involving a temporary restraining order are not. Shiffman v. 
Selective Serv. Bd. No. 5, 1 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3082 (2d Cir.), application for stay de-
nied, 391 U.S. 930 (1968). 
318. See w. BARRON 8: A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1431 (1968); 
3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 23.04-.06 (1958). 
319. See notes 2-3 supra and accompanying text. 
320. E.g., Germonprez v. Director, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3133 (D.D.C. 1970); Walsh 
v. Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Davis v. Hershey, 310 F. Supp. 
565 (C.D. Cal.), complaint dismissed, 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3194 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (finding 
no right to deferment), appeal dismissed, 3 SEL. SERV, L. REP. 3230 (9th Cir. 1970). One 
court has held that the harm to a registrant is irreparable if he is unlawfully required to 
choose among submitting to induction, submitting to induction and seeking release by 
habeas corpus, or refusing induction and incurring criminal prosecution. Stodolsky v. 
Hershey, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3527 (W.D. Wis. 1969). 
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another, since the Selective Service System has consistently provided 
the Armed Forces with more men than the monthly quota it is called 
upon to supply.321 Accordingly, the courts have not hesitated to 
exercise their discretion to enjoin inductions found to be contrary 
to law.822 
B. Declaratory Judgment 
In addition to having his induction enjoined, a plaintiff in a 
preinduction action may seek relief in the form of a declaratory 
judgment. Declaratory judgments are provided for in sections 2201 
and 2202 of the Judicial Code,323 and the procedure for obtaining 
such relief is set out in rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The declaratory-judgment procedure has been utilized with 
some success in preinduction selective service actions by plaintiffs 
seeking to have the court declare them to be entitled to a particular 
classification, 324 and to declare invalid certain Selective Service pro-
cedures or pronouncements.325 
321. A presidential commission reported that in 1966 and 1967 the Selective Ser-
vice System actually inducted in an average month more than 103% of the call levied 
on it. TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., REPORT X-1, X-2 
(1967). See also NATL. ADVISORY COMMN. ON SELECTIVE SERV., IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: 
WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? 156-57 (1967). 
322. E.g., Rich v. Hershey, 303 F. Supp. 177 (D. Colo. 1969); Keller v. Hershey, 309 
F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Fla. 1969). For cases in which courts have declined to exercise their 
discretion, see, e.g., National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1123-24 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (refusing to enjoin application of Hershey directive because "[t]he 
practical problems of enforcing an injunction against every local and appellate draft 
board are staggering."); Shiffman v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 5, 1 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3082 
(2d Cir. 1968) (upholding a district court's refusal to issue a temporary restraining order 
because of plaintiff's unreasonable delay after receiving his induction order in applying 
for relief); Kahn v. Secretary of HEW, 302 F. Supp. 178 (D. Mass. 1969) (failure to 
show reasonable probability of success on the merits). 
323. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964). 
324. E.g., Foley v. Hershey, 409 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Walsh v. 
Local Bd. No. 10, 309 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
325. E.g., National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
But see Becker v. Hershey, 309 F. Supp. 487 (D. Conn. 1969), in which the court, al-
though basing its decision on lack of jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' local boards, ex-
pressed a reluctance to grant a declaratory judgment that all graduate students who 
have received their baccalaureate degrees prior to July 1, 1967, are entitled to the 
I-S classification. It is noteworthy that the same district judge had granted such 
declaratory relief to an individual student in Carey v. Local Bd. No. 2, 297 F. Supp. 
252 (D. Conn.), afjd., 412 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1969). The plaintiffs in Becker had brought 
a class action in which they sought to secure relief for themselves and others similarly 
situated. The court declined to provide such relief, without prejudice to the plaintiffs' 
filing individual actions, on the ground that "a stable body of national law is the role 
of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, not that of a single federal district 
judge." 309 F. Supp. at 489. But Becker would appear to have been a perfect case for 
a class action. The class of graduate students involved is so numerous as to make 
individual joinder impracticable, the questions of law are common to the class, re-
peated litigations might establish inconsistent standards for the Selective Service System 
106 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:55 
C. Mandamus 
A third form of relief that may be sought in a preinduction 
action is relief in the nature of mandamus under section 1361 of 
the Judicial Code.326 This provision enables the court to compel a 
federal officer or agency to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. 
The courts have granted mandamus relief in several selective ser-
vice cases, and have ordered local boards to cancel induction orders327 
and to grant registrants particular classifications.328 
D. Enjoining the Enforcement of an Act of Congress 
A three-judge federal district court must be convened whenever 
a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the enforcement of an act of Congress 
alleged to be unconstitutional.329 The request to convene a three-
judge court is initially made to a district judge who must determine 
whether the constitutional question raised is substantial and whether 
the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief.330 
A challenge to the constitutionality of section 10(b)(3) has been 
held not to require the convening of a three-judge court on the 
ground that the constitutionality of the provision, although drawn 
into question, was not central to plaintiff's primary claim to enjoin 
to apply to students who should be treated alike, and the system has refused to grant 
the deferment to such students on grounds generally applicable to the class. See FED. 
R. Crv. P. 23. One court has granted declaratory relief in class actions involvfog the 
I-S deferment, Ellis v. Hershey, 302 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Mich. 1969), and the III-A 
deferment, Gregory v. Hershey, 311 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969), 2 SEL. SERV. L. 
REP. 3604 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (supplemental order). For a discussion of class actions 
under rule 23, a procedure which would seem particularly appropriate in selective 
service preinduction actions, see generally Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations 
Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39 (1967); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil 
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pt. 1, 81 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 356, 375-400 (1967). 
326. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964). See notes 287-99 supra and accompanying text. 
327. E.g., Hardenberg v. Selective Serv. Sys., 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3315 (D. Minn. 
1969); Itzcovitz v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 6, 301 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal 
dismissed, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3063 (2d Cir. 1970). 
328. E.g., Knutson v. Selective Serv. Sys., 304 F. Supp. 730 (D. Minn. 1969); Carey 
v. Local Bd. No. 2, 297 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn.), affd., 412 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1969). 
329. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1964). See generally Currie, The Three-Judge District 
Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CH1. L. R.Ev. I (1964). 
330. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962); Del 
Bourgo v. Mansfield, 300 F. Supp. 500, 501 (N.D. Cal. 1967), vacated and dismissed for 
mootness, 300 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1968). A claim "lacks substantiality if prior 
decisions foreclose the subject or if the question raised obviously is without merit." 
O'Hair v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 815, 820 (D.D.C. 1968). See Medeiros v. United 
States, 294 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1968) (claim that Selective Service Act would subject 
plaintiff to involuntary servitude found to lack substantiality); Smith v. Leach, 294 F. 
Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (claim that § 10(b)(3) is unconstitutional found to lack 
substance since it merely codifies the Estep case); Katz v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 
29 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (claim that Selective Service Act violates ninth amendment found to 
be "obviously without merit"). 
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his induction.331 A three-judge court may be assembled only when 
the operation of an entire statutory scheme is sought to be en-
joined;832 it may not be convened merely to test the acts or regu-
lations of an administrative agency.333 Once a three-judge court has 
been designated, only that court may grant a preliminary or perma-
nent injunction,834 although the single district judge to whom the 
original application is made may grant a temporary restraining 
order.885 
E. Injunction Pending Appeal 
If the district court dismisses a preinduction selective service 
action and the plaintiff decides to appeal that decision, an injunction 
forbidding induction pending appeal will be necessary to prevent 
the appeal from becoming moot. Such an injunction should be 
sought initially from the district court.836 If the court denies relief, 
or if application to the district court is impracticable, a motion for 
such relief may be made to the court of appeals or to a judge 
thereof.887 Such a motion should be supported by a memorandum 
setting forth the reasons for the relief requested and the facts relied 
on. It should include affidavits if the facts are in dispute and rele-
vant portions of the record. Reasonable notice of the motion should 
be given to the defendant.838 
In ruling on whether to grant an injunction during the pendency 
of an appeal, the courts consider, among other things, the proba-
bility of success on the merits, the threat of irreparable injury if 
331. Faulkner v. Clifford, 289 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Petersen v. Clark, 285 
F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1968). 
332. E.g., Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (three-judge court con-
vened to consider constitutionality of student deferment section of statute), afjd., 393 
U.S. 316 (1969) (per curiam). 
333. William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939); Del Bourgo v. 
Mansfield, 300 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (attack on constitutionality of special 
form for conscientious objector); Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 284 F. 
Supp. 749 (D. Conn.) (attack on constitutionality of Hershey directive), afjd., 406 F.2d 
636 (2d Cir. 1968), revd. on other grounds, 396 U.S. 460 (1970). 
334. 28 u.s.c. § 2282 (1964). 
335. 28 u.s.c. § 2284(3) (1964). 
336. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c). E.g., Mulligan v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 64, 2 SEL. 
SERV, L. REP. 3686 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (stay pending appeal granted). 
337. Fm. R. APP. P. 8. E.g., Bowen v. Hershey, 410 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1969) (stay 
pending appeal granted); Foley v. Hershey, 409 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1969) (injunction 
pending appeal granted); Zigmond v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 F.2d 290 
(1st Cir. 1968) (stay pending appeal dissolved). 
338. See H. L£vv, How To HANDLE AN APPEAL 406-10 (1968). For a discussion of a 
similar notice requirement with respect to temporary restraining orders, see Kaplan, 
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, pt. 2, 81 HARV. L. REv. 591, 609 (1968). 
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immediate relief is denied, the harm resulting to the adversary if 
the relief is granted, and the effect upon the public interest.339 A 
plaintiff's motion should make a strong showing that he is likely 
to prevail on the merits. He should attempt to demonstrate that 
immediate and irreparable injury will result if his induction is not 
enjoined, since induction will render his appeal moot and may de-
prive him of the statutory right he seeks to vindicate.84° Furthermore, 
a plaintiff should contend that this irreparable harm is extreme 
when measured against any inconvenience to the public interest 
caused by the delay of his induction,841 a contention which is espe-
cially reasonable since delay in the plaintiff's training as a soldier 
would also result from his refusal to submit to induction or from 
a habeas corpus attack from within the Armed Forces. Moreover, 
a plaintiff should argue that the public interest would be furthered 
by judicial resolution of the substantial controversy that his case 
presents.842 
Should the court of appeals deny the request for an injunction 
pending appeal, the plaintiff's final recourse is to seek that relief 
from the Supreme Court.343 An application for a stay is addressed 
to an individual Justice of the Supreme Court-usually the Justice 
assigned to the federal judicial circuit in which the case arose344-
in his capacity as Circuit Justice.345 If that Justice denies relief, 
the plaintiff may renew his application to any other Justice, although 
such renewed applications are not favored.346 A lower court refusal 
339. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958); 
Covington v. Schwartz, 230 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1964), modified, 341 F.2d 537 (9th 
Cir. 1965). 
340. E.g., a registrant claiming the right to a student deferment whose induction 
is not enjoined can accept induction and then bring habeas corpus to vindicate his 
right. But such relief can come only after an interruption of study, which would frus• 
trate the very right granted by the statute. If the student refuses induction, he will be 
arrested and prosecuted for his refusal. Even though he might ultimately be acquitted, 
the criminal proceedings will similarly interrupt the student's education. 
341. See note 321 supra and accompanying text. 
342. It is a "federal policy to grant stays where • • • denial of the stay will do 
irreparable harm to the applicant ... [and where] [s]ubstantial and unresolved ques-
tions • • • are presented." Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54 (1968) (Douglas, Circuit 
Justice). 
343. SUP. CT. R. 50. See R. STERN &: E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 563-84 
(4th ed. 1969). E.g., Kaplysh v. Hershey, 394 U.S. 901 (1969) (stay denied); Shilfman 
v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 5, 391 U.S. 930 (1968) (stay denied); Oestereich v. 
Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 1 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3027 (1967) (stay granted). 
344. SUP. CT. R. 50(4). 
345. See generally Note, The Powers of the Supreme Court Justice Acting in an 
Individual Capacity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 981 (1964). 
346. SUP. CT. R. 50(4). But see Morse v. Boswell, 393 U.S. 802 (1968), in which Justice 
Douglas had granted interim stays after Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black had 
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to grant a stay is given great weight, 847 but the presence of real and 
irreparable injury, the possibility of mootness if the stay is denied, 
the likelihood that the Court will hear the case, and the significance 
and novelty of the issues raised may make the case appropriate for 
the granting of a stay.348 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The history of preinduction judicial review in selective service 
cases dates, for the most part, from the 1967 Wolff case. Although 
Congress, concerned with the efficiency of the selection process, 
attempted to prevent early review by amending section I0(b)(3), 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of that section in Oestereich 
and Breen has resulted in the expansion of such review. 
The very heart of the Selective Service System consists of the 
nearly 4,100 local draft boards that comprise it.849 The vast discre-
tion lodged in these boards and the low public visibility of their 
operations make them particularly susceptible to abuses-abuses 
which are intolerable when committed by those entrusted with the 
grave responsibility of conscripting our nation's young men into 
the Armed Forces.850 Permitting early judicial scrutiny of alleged 
board deprivations of the rights of registrants will, more than any 
other safeguard, serve to prevent such abuses. Such review will deter 
local board misconduct far more than will postinduction judicial 
relief which may not come until long after the classification process 
is at an end. The threat of such preinduction relief will cause the 
board to proceed more carefully and to seek advice from state and 
national headquarters more often.351 Moreover, the early review 
permitted under the Oestereich rule defers to local board expertise 
and will not result in judicial interference with the discretion com-
mitted to the board. Although a registrant's induction can be delayed 
by filing a preinduction action, the courts can be relied on to refuse 
denied such applications. See the discussion of Morse in Winters v. United States, 89 
S. Ct. !14, 35 (1968) (Harlan, Circuit Justice). 
347. Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 164 (1923). 
348. See Zigmond v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 391 U.S. 930, 932 n.3 (1968) 
austice Douglas, dissenting). R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 343, at 577-84. 
349. See J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, LITILE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELECTIVE 
SERVICE SYSI'EM 54 (1968); Rabin, A Strange Brand of Selectivity: Administrative Law 
Perspectives on the Processing of Registrants in the Selective Service System, 17 UCLA 
L. REV. 1005, 1006-11 (1970). 
350. See Walsh v. Local Bd. No. IO, 305 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
351. Tigar & Zweben, Selective Service: Some Certain Problems and Some Tentative 
Answers, ?,7 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 510, 530-31 (1969). 
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injunctions in frivolous actions. The delay of induction is slight in 
any case since essentially legal rather than factual judicial deter-
minations are involved. Moreover, the slight delay that does exist 
does not substantially interfere with the selection process, since the 
Selective Service System always more than fills its quota. Nor will 
such a delay enable a registrant to escape liability for service by 
becoming older, since an induction order, once issued, remains out-
standing.852 Preinduction judicial review, therefore, without hinder-
ing the efficient process of conscription, promotes a "system of 
selection which is fair and just."858 
352. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1632.14, 1632.2(d) (1970). See Stella v. Selective Serv. Local Bel. 
No. 66, 427 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1970). 
353. 50 U.S.C. App. § 45l(c) (1964). 
